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Abstract 
The NASA Extra Vehicular Activity Retriever (EVAR) robot is being designed to retrieve 
astronauts or objects that become detached from the orbiting Space Station. This task requires 
that the robot’s intelligent controller must rely heavily on orbital dynamics predictions, without 
becoming blind to the wide variety of anomalies that may occur. 
This article describes the controller’s Universal Plan (U.P.) and some technical lessons learned 
from it. The UP. reacts not to actual current states but to estimated states, which are obtained 
using goal-directed active perception. A modal logic formalization of discrete-event dynamics 
allows us to finely analyze and specify the interactions of knowledge, belief, sensing, acting, and 
time within the UP. The U.P. now acts like a hands-off manager: it makes regular observations, 
grants some leeway for unobservable or ill-modelled processes, has faith in subsystem dynamics, 
and takes action only to manipulate subsystems into delivering desired progress. Most of the time, 
the appropriate action is to do nothing. 
Finally we examine properties of the application that allowed the U.P. to deliver robust goal 
achievement despite misleading state estimates, weak models of relevant processes, and unpre- 
dictable disturbances. 
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1. Project overview 
The control system to be discussed herein was implemented for the NASA Extra- 
Vehicular Activity Retriever ’ (EVAR), a robot that will be deployed in space later 
this decade to locate and retrieve astronauts or other objects that become untethered 
from Space Station or Shuttle. Each retrieval mission will involve sensor acquisition of 
the target object, rendezvous with the object, stand-off, grappling, sensor acquisition of 
home base, return with the object, stand-off, and delivery. 
The project of implementing the control system had two purposes. One was the 
production of the control system itself. The other, imposed on us by forward-thinking 
NASA staff. was to provide a demonstration of the value of putting intelligent hardware 
in space. NASA is very cautious about the workings of anything that goes into space, 
and for good reason: a malfunction can cost billions of dollars. A natural consequence 
is that NASA mistrusts the AI enterprise because it is deliberately building programs 
that do things even the systems’ own programmers can’t predict in detail. Our control 
system was to be an example of such a program, and we were to demonstrate that, 
despite the unpredictability of our intelligent software’s behavior-or rather, because of 
it-the control system could be reliable and safe. 
At the heart of the control system was a Universal Plan (UP) [ 531 -a representation 
for robotic discrete-event control laws that is amenable to automatic synthesis, and which 
is highly conditional and very fast by virtue of its ready translation into equivalent 
decision trees. As required for the project’s higher purpose, the plan’s sequence of 
decisions was largely unpredictable, depending heavily on what was happening in the 
environment outside the control system. 
To demonstrate the safety of our control system in a convincing way, NASA decided 
that they would themselves build the simulator for testing our controller. (Testing our 
controller on a real robot in space was impossible for obvious reasons.) NASA pro- 
grammers were then free to make the physical dynamics as realistic as they wished, and 
to smuggle into the simulation whatever strange events they wished (including some un- 
intended malfunctions). The simulator included not only the usual physical environment 
such as orbital motion, a space station, astronauts, and the robot’s own hardware and 
physics, but also the robot’s laser-based perception subsystem, so that from our point 
of view there was no difference between a perceptual misinterpretation and a strange 
physical event. The simulator also provided a menu of accidents that could be introduced 
at the user’s will. 
The project’s final demonstration for NASA successfully rescued a free-floating as- 
tronaut despite such events as space station windows that looked like astronauts until 
the robot got close enough; an astronaut being instantly moved further way or closer in; 
an astronaut rescuing herself by grabbing the robot instead of waiting to be grabbed; 
successfully grabbed astronauts who then escaped; failed attempts to grab an astronaut; 
collisions with meteorites large enough to impart arbitrary rotations and translations; ef- 
fector commands and data requests that were either deliberately ignored or inexplicably 
’ Extra-vehicular activity is anything happening in open space. The name might be taken to mean either that 
the robot is extra-vehicular, or that it retrieves other things engaged in extra-vehicular activity. 
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lost in transmission; and so forth. The success of our approach may be judged from 
the fact that our clients decided at one point not to bother fixing certain bugs in their 
simulator, because our control system works in spite of them. Our control system is now 
routinely demonstrated to senior NASA officials by allowing them to interfere with the 
robot’s activities as they choose. 
Universal Plans (U.P.s) were initially designed to display robust recovery from unpre- 
dictable events, and this feature was central to our success, but the robotic application 
demanded several technical innovations to enlarge the range of realizable behaviors. 
Our plan had to monitor its own activities by performing sensor control actions and 
requesting world state estimates from the perception subsystem, and also needed to 
act to forestall events that had not happened yet. These problems required, and were 
solved by, adding new dimensions to the state space/domain model, in the form of 
new kinds of conditions the plan could test and react to. The required additional sub- 
tlety was achieved with modal logic operators for knowledge, belief, and branching 
time, which were introduced into the representation in such a way that all aspects of 
the domain description-predicates, actions, domain constraints, and states-could be 
infiltrated with the necessary modal operators. Although these innovations have been 
described in earlier papers [56,57], they will be presented here in greater detail and 
from a more control-theoretic viewpoint. 
The focus of this paper will be our last representational extension, providing the ability 
to monitor dynamics, hold beliefs about the future, and react to the presence of particular 
expectations. Thus we added, to the UP representation’s prior ability to recover robustly 
from disturbances, a new ability to distinguish disturbances from dynamics and use the 
latter to advantage. 
We begin by describing prior constraints on how the project was carried out; these 
constraints motivated some design decisions and also limited our progress. Next we 
present our modal logic formalization of dynamics, and then the implementation of 
our UP as an experiment on the validity and utility of our formalization. Finally we 
report on what we learned from our experiment, listing the capabilities accrued from 
our representational extensions, and the principles and issues we discovered. 
Included among our “lessons learned” (Section 6) are the following: 
l where to put the boundary between the control system and the controlled system 
(hint: beliefs about the state of the operating environment comprise yet another 
independent dynamic subsystem) ;
l why the architecture became neither a synchronous sense-act cycle, nor two asyn- 
chronous acting and monitoring subsystems, but a hybrid in which several asyn- 
chronous sensor&motor loops were managed by a synchronous belief-monitoring 
cycle; 
l how to rely on dynamics without becoming defenceless against abnormal or unpre- 
dictable events, and why plan execution came to mean doing nothing most of the 
time; 
l why we believe that knowledge restricting possible courses of events belongs in 
the state estimation subsystem, not in action selection; 
l what it was about the astronaut retrieval domain that enabled our controller to be 
effective, and why similar effectiveness is likely to be achievable in general; 
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l why standard control systems notions split the qualification problem into two sub- 
problems addressable with appropriate solution techniques; 
l the need for action decisions to directly affect beliefs, even before the decisions 
have any physical consequences. 
2. Prior constraints 
In this section we present the constraints on our work. We explain the general Uni- 
versal Plan (UP) concept and how the UP for this project relates to it; we review 
some control theory; and we describe the simulated robot we controlled. 
2.1. Robust reactive behavior 
UPS were designed to display an extreme robustness against unexpected events [ 521. 
This was accomplished by making UPS equivalent to decision trees, which apply a 
sequence of tests to map every possible situation to one of the tree’s leaf nodes, where 
the response appropriate to that type of situation is stored. Iterated execution of such 
a decision tree will then map each new situation to a response, no matter what the 
previous situation was. Thus, UPS may be summarized as conveying highly conditional 
advice of the form 
If a situation satisfying condition P should ever arise while you are trying to 
achieve goal G, then the appropriate response is action A. 
Consequently UPS are capable of responding to all sequences of events-even physically 
impossible ones-and the behavior of an agent executing a fixed U.P. depends critically 
on which situations arise at plan execution time. 
In this respect UPS can be compared to the differential equations of control theory, 
which create attractor and repulsor states in the state space without “representing” any 
actual behavior over any period of time. To explicitly predict behavior in advance of 
its occurrence, the equations must be integrated from a given starting point. Similarly, 
planning was traditionally approached as a problem of finding suitable sequences or 
trajectories through the state space, assuming a given initial state and some constraints 
on state transitions. The U.P. philosophy, akin to that of control theorists, is: why bother 
to guess a starting point, integrate the equations, and search for trajectories, when the 
devices being controlled will invariably depart from any behavior predicted in detail. It 
is possible to achieve good control by analyzing the equations themselves. In the case 
of UPS, it is similarly possible to obtain robust goal-directed control by analyzing the 
plans themselves, without analyzing any state or action sequences. (What is analyzed 
instead is the ability to reach one state space region from another, where a region is the 
set of all states satisfying some test.) 
The extreme robustness of UPS, even to the point of allowing physically impossible 
courses of events, was found to be indispensible to our work with EVAR. While it 
may be obvious that reality is not accessible except via error-prone perception software, 
so that the plan is reacting not to its physical environment but to its estimations and 
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guesses thereon, this has the less obvious consequence that physically impossible courses 
of events do occur-not in nature, of course, but certainly in the robot’s perceptions. 
We shall come back to this topic in Section 6.4. 
2.2. Automatic synthesis 
UPS were the first form of “reactive plan” for which automated synthesis was demon- 
strated [ 531 (in [ 381 no mention is made of automated goal conflict resolution during 
the compilation of situated automata). Nevertheless, for the present work, automated 
UP synthesis was deliberately avoided: had we so much as modified a UP planner 
during this project, our employer could legally have prevented us from pursuing related 
research anywhere else. Therefore, the UP to be described below was built by hand in 
C, but with great vigilance for a future return to automated synthesis-we consciously 
viewed the C code as the compiled UP. that might have been produced by suitable 
reasoning algorithms. To ensure that our C code remained faithful to the output of our 
imaginary UP compiler and hence to the UP formalism itself, we: 
l reduced the UP. as much as possible to a small number of macros that encoded 
our understanding of how an automatically synthesized UP would have worked; 
l complied with such macros even if it meant defining C functions to do nothing but 
return true, and even if it meant defining the same subplan under several different 
names (e.g. when a subplan achieved several goals); 
l formalized (e.g. with modal logic) any new capabilities needed by the plan; 
l operationalized the achievement of modally qualified goals by modifying the rele- 
vant macros; 
l marked all deviations from an automatically synthesized UP with “HACK!" com- 
ments. 
This discipline continued throughout the project. As a result the C code was rife with 
function names like achb_soon_sust-kw_clamp_open(), which was the name of the 
subplan for requesting an update on the status of the robot’s gripper-our formalizations 
were very evident in our C code. 
Since the completion of the U.P. written in C we have modified our UP interpreter and 
planning algorithms, and have checked that the newly introduced modal logic operators 
generate the proper deductions and goal conflicts. Consequently we can confidently 
assert that our modal logic extensions to the UP formalism have both preserved the 
ability to synthesize UPS automatically, and solved the control problems we intended 
them to solve. However, because of a few deliberate “HACKS" in the C version of the 
U.P. (see Section 7.2) it is not yet possible to synthesize a functionally equivalent UP 
automatically. 
Our concern with automated synthesis is also a large factor in understanding some 
of the limitations of our final UP Most obvious in this respect is our choice of modal 
logic to distinguish knowledge goals. We made this choice even though we were well 
aware at the time that sensors deliver uncertain data, while the modal formula “k P” is 
either true or false, with nothing in between. And indeed, our formalism’s inability to 
reflect uncertainty at the symbol level has left us currently unable to encode multi-sensor 
fusion within the existing UP formalism. However, modal logic has very clear formal 
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semantics and, beginning with [ 421, has made several appearances in planning systems, 
in contrast to more quantitative formalisms such as Bayes nets and utility models, which 
could not be usefully assembled from simple context-independent components when our 
work began [ 32,621. We chose to protect automatic synthesis of UPS at the expense 
of leaving a few other problems temporarily unsolved. 
2.3. Avoiding instability in the control hierarchy 
At the beginning of our work, NASA decided that they would themselves build 
the simulation to be used for testing our UP-based controller. In the simulation they 
would use the actual perception and control algorithms that were being used by the 
hardware robot, to deprive us of direct access to simulated world state. In this way 
NASA retained complete control of simulation realism, and relieved us of the need to 
write fast servo loops for the robot’s effecters, but gave us instead the control issues 
attending hierarchical control systems: the software would have at least two levels, one 
for the servo loops and one for our U.P. 
In “hierarchical multi-rate” control systems slow loops control fast loops, as in our 
case, by changing set-points or other parameters in the servo loops. Even if it is known 
that the fast loops are stable for fixed parameter values, the combined system in which 
the parameters are variable may be unstable. One way to see this is to think of the 
textbook example of stability: a spring that is fixed at one end, has a movable weight at 
the other, and experiences some friction. If we pull the weight from its rest position and 
then release it, it will be pulled back and will eventually stop. Now consider the position 
of the fixed end to be a parameter, and suppose that we start moving the previously 
fixed end back and forth by a fixed distance. If we do that at just the right frequency, the 
weight at the other end will make larger and larger oscillations. This is the phenomenon 
of instability, caused in this case by our constant meddling with a parameter of an 
otherwise stable system. 
A similar phenomenon arises when a controller tries to control a nonlinear plant 
by treating it as several operating regions in which it is linear. The controller then 
dynamically switches between the control laws for the operating regions, in a procedure 
commonly known as “gain scheduling” [59]. Here too it is possible that, even when 
the control law for each operating region is stable, the switching could happen in just 
the right way to make the complete system unstable. 
The control engineer’s rule of thumb for avoiding instability in these cases is to 
ensure that parameter adjustment (the slow loop) runs at much lower frequency than 
the system being controlled (i.e. the fast loop). This is one of the reasons that the 
number 10 comes up frequently in descriptions of hierarchical architectures such as 
NASREM [ 31 -in such contexts the number 10 is an implicit reference to a serious 
outstanding problem. The control theory required to solve this problem properly has 
only recently been developing [ 49,591. 
Obeying the applicable rule of thumb, our UP executes approximately twice per 
second. This is much less than 1 / 10 the natural frequencies of the subsystems being 
controlled, so the danger of instability is minimal. 
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2.4. The Nyquist Sampling Theorem 
When a control loop is not instantaneous, the data being used to compute a reaction 
may change in mid-loop, leading to inappropriate reactions. The usual solution is to 
“sample and hold”: take a snapshot of world state at the beginning of a loop, and hold 
that data constant until the reaction has been computed. If the variables being monitored 
are oscillating, it is possible that this technique will take its snapshots at just the right 
frequency so that the variables appear to be stationary. Similarly, it is also possible that 
transient behavior is missed completely, or that the perceived frequency of oscillation is 
some fraction of the actual one. 
The Nyquist Sampling Theorem (see e.g. [4] ) states that to determine the actual 
frequency of an oscillating input signal, that signal must be sampled at more than twice 
the frequency of the signal. 
It follows that, executing twice per second, the U.P. cannot respond properly to 
any process with a frequency of 2 1 hertz. The UP could have been executed at much 
higher frequency-at some risk to total system stability, see Section 2.3-but since high- 
frequency oscillations relating to the control of individual effecters had been delegated 
to servo loops, < 1 hertz was thought to be fast enough for the UP 
2.5. The robot’s construction 
To understand the plan fragments presented in this paper it is necessary to know 
something of EVAR’s capabilities and construction. EVAR is designed for free flight on 
orbit. It can accelerate in any direction at any time, and can rotate about all three of its 
body axes at the same time, if required. It has two arms, one of which is equipped with a 
clamp. The clamp is instrumented with a sensor to indicate whether the clamp is open: at 
present there is no contact or proximity sensor. EVAR has three chest cameras mounted 
side by side so that their fields of view overlap slightly, and so that their combined fields 
of view span 180 degrees horizontally, (This arrangement allows EVAR to perform a 
visual scan in all directions by doing a backwards somersault.) A directable scanning 
laser range finder is mounted on top of EVAR’s “shoulders”, and has a rectangular field 
of view 60 degrees wide and high. The laser can be pointed at anything above the plane 
of EVAR’s shoulders, hence cannot look at anything that is more than 30 degrees below 
that plane unless the whole robot is rotated. 
3. On the modal formalization 
Our work began with a conception of U.P.s wherein plans simply stated what should be 
done in various circumstances, much like a production system. But because we wished 
to build embedded systems, we were immediately forced to diverge from production 
systems by including some way to describe actions that brought information from the 
outside world into the executing plan. A modal logic of knowledge was introduced 
to play that role. Since some actions are valuable even if some of their preconditions 
have not been recently sensed, we also needed a way to represent information that 
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had been derived from earlier knowledge using a dynamics model. A modal logic of 
belief was introduced to fill that gap. Finally, it was necessary to represent some of the 
dynamics of the application domain, so that approaching events could be anticipated 
and appropriate measures taken, whether those measures consisted of doing nothing, of 
initiating corrective action, or of continuing existing activities. This last gap was filled by 
a modal logic of branching time, adapted to model both open- and closed-loop dynamics. 
An intuitive feeling for the results may be had from the following interpretations of the 
modal operators: 
l Knowledge of the state of the world is obtainable only by performing sensing 
actions at plan execution time. Such knowledge lasts only a few seconds, or until 
an action negates it, whichever comes first. 
l Beliefs about current and future states of the world arise either as projections of 
earlier beliefs forward through time, or as expectations following on the heels of 
goals communicated to robot subsystems. Both sets of beliefs are licensed by the 
continuous and discrete domain models provided by the system designer. 
l After initiating robotic action, the executing plan may believe the eventual attain- 
ment of desired effects, but may specifically not believe that the desired effects 
have been obtained, unless the action is described as being instantaneous. 
l Sensing actions are described as enabling the belief that it will eventually be the 
case that 
P is known to be true or P is known to be false, 
so that at plan construction time the results of such actions are ambiguous, with 
disambiguation occurring only during plan execution. Sensing actions rarely have 
instantaneous results. 
l All relevant processes (including environmental processes, robotic actions, and 
sensing) are monitored not only for their success but also for their progress, and 
are evaluated for their compatibility with desired futures. 
The modal logic formulations of knowledge, belief, and branching time were adopted 
for UPS on the following pragmatic grounds. 
( I ) Modal logics were well understood formalisms with soundness and completeness 
theorems. 
(2) If all conditions appearing in action preconditions, postconditions, domain con- 
straints, and goals were systematically infiltrated with modal operators, this would 
safeguard the ability to automatically check the logical consistency of domain 
models and of plans. 
(3) Modal conditions in plans could be operationalized for plan execution (by means 
of tests on perception-based data) without imposing any formalism-specific com- 
putational burden at plan execution time. 
We now discuss the modal logics in greater detail. 
3. I. Knowledge and beliej 
When a plan or procedure is being carried out by a system embedded in the real 
world (e.g. a robot), there must be some way to determine whether the plan is working. 
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Given that sensing is necessary and that thejexible use of a sensor will require effector 
activity (such as moving the sensor platform relative to the robot body, or moving the 
whole robot body), the sensory activities and their supporting effector activities had 
better become part of the plan, and both had better be represented in such a way that 
their effects and interactions can be reasoned about during plan construction. 
The U.P.s formalization of sensing actions closed a gap between three bodies of plan- 
ning work. First, there was work on automated reasoning about knowledge and action. 
This work had not represented sensing actions whose outcomes were unpredictably ei- 
ther true or false, and had not planned the use of sensing actions to check whether other 
executed actions had worked as desired. For example, when Moore [42, pp. 121f] had 
a safe-opening action produce the knowledge that the safe was open, this was done not 
by planning a sensing action to find out at plan execution time whether the safe was 
open or closed, but by showing that if the safe were assumed open (or closed) then, 
after simulating the safe-opening action, the planner would “know” that the safe was 
open (or closed). Of course, the planner could equally well assume that the safe was 
still closed, and actually had no reason to make either assumption. Similarly, none of the 
formalisms of Drummond [ 15, Section 5.121, Haas [ 3 11, Konolige [ 401 or Morgen- 
stern [43] were used to represent actions whose execution would check the outcomes 
of other planned actions. 
Second, there was work on automatically creating or modifying plans to include 
sensing actions that verified progress during plan execution, but none of that work had 
made use of logical formalisms for reasoning about knowledge, e.g. [ 9,14,19,28,60]. 
Third, there was a body of work on situated agency wherein relatively sophisticated 
execution-time sensing was common-place, but here again, the knowledge preconditions 
of actions were not formalized. The previous work closest to our needs was that of 
Rosenschein [48], which presented a formal account of the knowledge obtainable by 
embedded systems at execution time, but did not use that formalism for action repre- 
sentation. 
This gap was closed by Schoppers [56] who infiltrated the first-order terms of an 
otherwise ordinary planning domain model with modal operators for knowledge and 
belief [ 33,371. Consequently, the pre- and post-conditions of actions, and the declarative 
domain constraints, could all make use of modal terms. This preserved the value of 
logical deduction for plan synthesis purposes. “Knowledge” was then interpreted as 
“perceptually verified information”, and the achievement of knowledge goals was enabled 
by means of two axioms: 
kw P z k P v k-d? (Axiom 1 ) 
kPsbPr\kwP. (Axiom 2) 
Axiom 1 defines “knowing-whether” as an undetermined outcome, and is used to de- 
scribe sensing actions and pose sensing goals. Since ordinary physical effects do not 
automatically provide perceptual information, goals involving the kw modality can only 
be achieved by sensing. Axiom 2 is used to resolve, into two subgoals, goals requiring 
the achievement of definite knowledge k P of some condition I? * One subgoal can 
* In earlier papers this axiom required P rather than b P because the distinction between actual and believed 
facts had not been completed. 
initiate the use of effector actions; the other can initiate the use of sensing actions to 
perceive whether an effector action is necessary and/or successful. 
To support the representation of information other than knowledge-for example, 
estimates of present world state or convictions about future events-a modal belief 
operator b was also introduced into the plan representation. The logic S.5 was chosen 
for the knowledge modality, in part because the S5 system was the simplest suitable 
system, and in part because the formalization of [ 481 turned out to be S5 (cf. [ 171) The 
logic weak-S5 was chosen for the belief modality. Both systems contain the following 
as axioms or theorems, in which b may be uniformly replaced by k: 
b(P > Q) > (b P > b Q). 
b P > -b-P 
bP=bbP. 
-b P = b-b P. 
In addition, the stronger S5 system contains the axiom characterizing knowledge as true: 
kP>P. 
Finally, the knowledge operator was related to the belief operator in the usual way: 
kP>bP. 
bP=_kbP. 
These modal operators for knowledge and belief, and especially Axiom 2 above, were 
central to the design of our C-language UP, but were not used to support automated 
reasoning until long after that U.P. had been completed. 
3.2. Dynamics, disturbances, and system boundaries 
At the beginning of our work with EVAR, UPS suffered from several time-related 
problems, including: 
l The plan insisted on acting as long as a desired condition was false, even if that 
condition would eventually become true without any further action on the plan’s 
part. For example, an early EVAR U.P. repeatedly told the laser scanner to move to 
a given position, even though the scanner was already on its way there and couldn’t 
move any faster. 
l The plan refused to act as long as a desired condition was true, even if that condition 
was about to become false very predictably and could be kept true with appropriate 
action. For example, an early EVAR UP coolly waited for an astronaut to drift 
out of the laser scanner’s field of view before bothering to move the scanner. Since 
the astronaut was gathering speed as she left the scanner’s field of view, the time 
required to re-find her could be unbearable to onlookers, and as a result the robot 
seemed chronically inept. 
Solving these problems demanded (among other things) an ability to encode and uti- 
lize, within an executing plan, beliefs about the near future. More specifically, since 
automatically constructed plans (including UPS) execute an action only if that action 
is achieving a goal, it was necessary to define, for each primary goal Gt that needed 
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to be kept true over some extended interval, a type of supporting oal G2 having the 
following properties: 
l G2 could be constructed from Gt by means of a simple device such as prefixing 
Gt with a modal operator; 
l if GI had not yet been achieved, then GZ should be false if and only if action was 
required to make Gt true; 
l if Gt had already been achieved, then GZ should be false if and only if action was 
required to keep Gt true; 
l G2 could sensibly be made the postcondition of an action, and as such could 
“clobber” other goals; 
l the truth or falsity of G2 could be determined by sensing the present state of the 
world. 
Furthermore, it was necessary to specify a mechanism for attaching G2 to Gt in plans, 
and to find a formalism capable of representing Gt, G2, and their logical relationship. 
None of the existing formalisms for modelling actions and processes over time ( [ 27, 
41,46,50], along with temporal modal logics and dynamic logic) provided a clean 
answer. In all cases it was either difficult or impossible to derive a condition Gz that 
was false at any time if and only if, no matter what actions were actually being taken 
at that time or later, luck of action would have resulted in Gt becoming true or false. 
Consideration of the differing consequences of action and inaction brings us directly 
to the distinction between closed-loop and open-loop control. Hence we now present 
some background information on controllers and dynamics. 
Feedback controllers are characterized by a closed loop from the controller through 
effecters to the system being controlled, through sensors, and back to the controller. 
If that loop is broken anywhere, be it because sensors are broken or nonexistent, or 
because the controller is turned off, the system becomes open-loop and feedback com- 
pensation becomes impossible. However, in an open-loop system in which the controller 
can still influence the effecters, feedforward compensation remains possible. Feedfor- 
ward compensation can observe a disturbance coming from somewhere outside the 
controlled system, can utilize a model of the controlled system to predict the effects of 
the disturbance on system behavior, and can counteract those predicted effects before 
any actual effect occurs (like bracing for an expected collision). For this to work the 
disturbance itself must be measurable and the model being used to predict its effects 
must be good, since a feedforward compensator will not be able to observe and correct 
any results differing from its intentions. Because of its complete dependence on a good 
system model, feedforward compensation is brittle and is usually combined with feed- 
back compensation. Feedback compensation allows a disturbance to have effects on the 
controlled system and then counteracts the observed (actual) effects. This is a much 
more robust control method, provided that the effects of disturbances can be tolerated. 
Almost all control systems are closed-loop. A sizeable fraction utilize both feedforward 
and feedback compensation. 
The terms “open-loop” and “closed-loop” are also loosely applied as qualifiers of 
dynamics. A dynamic is a rule about change over time. Open-loop dynamics are the 
principles governing the behavior of a system when it is running open-loop, which- 
given the brittleness of feedforward compensation-usually means that it is completely 
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uncontrolled. Closed-loop dynamics are the principles governing the behavior of a closed- 
loop system, including the effects of a feedback controller. As a simple example, a door 
may or may not stay open by itself, depending on the presence of a spring for closing 
it, and/or a door-stop for keeping it open. A spring-loaded door’s open-loop dynamics 
cause the door to close. When our robot continuously holds the door open, the door’s 
response to the ongoing action of our robotic agent is a closed-loop dynamic. 
Similarly, open-loop stability is a property of systems that possess a stable equilibrium 
without the continuous help of an automatic controller. All commercial passenger aircraft 
are open-loop stable for safety’s sake. If an aircraft is not closed-loop stable it cannot 
be flown. Most military aircraft are closed-loop stable but open-loop unstable, i.e. they 
can only fly with the continuous help of an automatic controller. This allows greater 
maneuverability, at cost of some risk to the pilot’s life. 
Implicit in the open/closed-loop distinction is a conceptual boundary around the 
system being controlled. When we say that a spring-loaded door’s closing behavior is 
open-loop, we are assuming a system containing both the door and the spring, with any 
controlling influence coming from somewhere else. If we were to consider the spring to 
be a trivial controller for a system consisting of the door only, then the door’s closing 
behavior would be closed-loop under the influence of the spring, and its open-loop 
behavior would then be to stop moving. 
Derived from this distinction are the two related concepts of unmodelled dynamics and 
disturbances. Unmodelled dynamics are dynamics we either know about and can safely 
ignore, or do not know about and may or may not be able to ignore. The behavior 
of any physical system can be analyzed and modelled only down to some level of 
abstraction determined by the modeller’s energy and measuring equipment. Below that 
level of abstraction there will be behaviors the modeller is initially unaware of-it is 
a given that unmodelled dynamics will exist. After building a controller and testing it 
on a simulation of the system being controlled, the modeller has only verified that the 
controller works on the model. The controller may not (or may) work when applied to 
the real system, depending on the unmodelled dynamics being (or not being) excited by 
the controller’s influence on the plant. In the worst case, unmodelled dynamics may be 
dependent on an infrequently occurring aspect of the controller’s action, so may not be 
discovered even during flight testing, yet may be so serious that, when finally excited, 
they cause the controlled system to become unstable and crash. 
The primary distinction between dynamics and disturbances is that dynamics arise 
somewhere in the control loop while disturbances do not. Disturbances may or may 
not be stochastic and may or may not be modelable, but they are not controllable. For 
example, a disk spinning inside a CD player will not be perfectly centered, so to follow 
a given track the laser head may have to oscillate at the same frequency as the disk. 
This oscillation is expected and very regular, yet is considered a disturbance because it 
cannot be controlled, it can only be compensated for.3 
Only these few terms already allow useful characterizations of AI planning work. 
Most of the planners built to date have been open-loop because there was neither any 
‘For this excellent example we thank Kjell Gustafsson, of the Department of Automatic Control, Lund 
Institute of Technology, Sweden. 
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effect on a physical plant, nor any feedback from sensors. A famous exception was 
STRIPS [ 201, which was a closed-loop controller because it did control a real robot and 
replan when sensor data warranted it, but STRIPS was largely a feedforward controller 
because Shakey, the robot it controlled, moved by dead reckoning and visually examined 
its environment only between movements, and the plan itself did nothing and received 
no feedback except between movements. 
The plans built by pre-1985 planners were brittle because the planners were operating 
as feedforward controllers, whether or not the plans were used to control a physical 
system. The dominant feature of the post-1985 “reactive planning” work was greater 
reliance on feedback. 
In the reactive planning literature one finds frequent assertions that the technology 
is especially suited to “dynamic, unpredictable, uncertain” domains. This conflation 
of dynamics with unpredictability is mistaken. Dynamics are predictable by definition 
(down to some level of abstraction). The real driver of reactive planning work-and 
the reason why feedback is essential-is robustness against disturbances. This has so far 
been pursued without any concern for exploiting open-loop dynamics. 
In summary, awareness of dynamics is necessary for efficient behavior: 
(1) If a system’s open-loop dynamics are such that the system will evolve toward 
certain desired conditions of its own accord, then it is not necessary to act on 
the system at all to achieve the desired ends. 
(2) If a system’s open-loop dynamics are such that the system will evolve away from 
certain desired conditions of its own accord, then it may be necessary to keep 
acting on the system even though the desired conditions are already true. That is, 
the plan must be able to react to the unwanted open-loop dynamic by replacing 
it with a suitable closed-loop dynamic. 
The latter case is sometimes referred to as “maintenance” or “prevention”. In UPS 
the distinction between open- and closed-loop dynamics serves to distinguish situations 
in which no action is necessary (because open-loop dynamics suffice) from situations 
in which action (a closed-loop dynamic) is required. Consequently the open- versus 
closed-loop distinction pervades our formalization of time. 
3.3. Branching time 
In this section we present our complete formalization of the distinction between open- 
loop and closed-loop dynamics, in terms of a modal logic of branching time (refer to 
Fig. 1). 
We begin with a model of world state, and subdivide that state into two parts, 
the state of the system being controlled, also called the “plant”, and the state of the 
controller, in this case the U.P. An estimate of plant state, encoded with real-valued 
variables, was obtained from sensor interpretation software and Kalman filtering software 
provided by NASA. This real-valued state estimate was intermittently requested by, and 
communicated to, our U.P., which applied various thresholding and comparison tests 
to the real-valued data. As described in Section 4.2, these tests evaluate the truth or 
falsity of modally qualified atomic formulae such as b soon sust kw in_laserfov (X> . 
The collection of such test outcomes translates the real-valued state estimate into a 
188 M. Sclloprer.~:r/Art~ficicll Intelligence 73 (1995) 175-230 
k 
hardware state of 
closed-loop future 
in space physical 
-t 
system open-loop future 
--s-0 _~_---------- 
perception & estimation .!w------- 
NASA’s i 
V 
















































reaction A now 
V 
Fig. I. Mapping perceived plant states into temporal model states 
(partial) Boolean state estimate. The Boolean state estimate is a partial “world state” 
in the planning sense, with the important difference that its contents are computed by 
abstracting from measurements of the actual plant, not by simulating action effects. This 
Boolean state estimate is used by the U.P to decide what to do. 
U.P. execution is assumed to manifest a kind of “sense-act cycle” of classifying the 
estimated state of the plant, acting accordingly, then repeating. The classification step 
computes the Boolean state estimate “on the fly” as the U.P. applies Boolean tests to 
the real-valued state estimate. The perceived state of the plant, in both its real-valued 
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and Boolean forms, can change only between sense-act cycles, so that each sense-act 
cycle is working off a frozen snapshot of the plant state. 
The UP needs to examine not only the Boolean abstraction of the currently perceived 
plan state, but also what might happen at various future times and under various scenar- 
ios. To provide a basis for answering such questions we construct a standard semantic 
model for the logic of branching time, as follows. We now imagine not only the current 
real-valued state estimate, but all possible real-valued state estimates, and we map each 
such estimate into the corresponding Boolean state estimate, thus obtaining the set of 
all possible Boolean state estimates. It is likely that many real-valued state estimates 
will map into a single Boolean state estimate. We can induce two relations on the set 
of Boolean state estimates, one relating each state to its successors under the open-loop 
behavior of the plant, and a similar relation for the plant’s closed-loop behavior. From 
these two relations we can construct a third relation, their union, which relates Boolean 
state estimates to their successors under either open- or closed-loop dynamics. In each 
of the two base relations a state estimate may give rise to different future developments, 
in the open-loop case because physics may he nondeterministic, and in the closed-loop 
case because we may choose to control the plant in different ways. Hence both successor 
relations are I:N and the temporal conception is one of branching futures. From here 
the development of the relevant modal logics is well studied, see e.g. [47]. Time is 
assumed to be infinite. 
The amount of time r that passes between the successive Boolean state estimates of 
the temporal model is determined by the plan execution machinery. We will assume 
7 > 0. 
Since the UP is perceiving the plant, and since the plant can only be in one state at 
a time, the UP’s Boolean state estimate will correspond to a particular one of the states 
in the temporal model, and the actual behavior of the plant over time will correspond to 
a particular one of the possible futures in the temporal model. However, the importance 
of the model is that it influences the UP’s choices of action, and those choices in turn 
influence which possible future becomes actual. 
The following branching time modal logic operators were used in this work. To avoid 
confusion between actual plant states and the Boolean states of the temporal model, the 
latter will be called “model states”. 
l next P is true at a given model state if condition P is true in the immediately 
succeeding model states in all open-loop futures. 
l soon P is true at a given model state if condition P becomes true eventually in all 
possible open-loop futures not including the present state. 
l sust P is true at a given model state if condition P is true not only in that state, 
but remains true forever in some possible future, whether or not action is required 
to keep it true. Then we say that P is “sustainable” from that state. 
l cant P is true at a given model state if condition P is true not only in that state, 
but remains true forever in all open-loop futures. Then P will “continue” to be true 
at least as long as the controller does nothing. 
The primary use of next is to test, when P is true of the perceived plant state in the 
current sense-act cycle, whether P will remain true at least until the next sense-act cycle, 
even if no action is taken to make it so. If that is true, the plan execution machinery 
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may do nothing now, and can reconsider later (next) whether P should go on being 
true even longer. If it is false, e.g. if P should remain true but inaction would cause it 
to become false, the appropriate response is to perform an action that achieves next P. 
Over a sequence of sense-act cycles, the plan’s determination that next P should remain 
true turns out to be a moment-by-moment way of keeping P true continuously-a way 
that does not need to commit to whether P’s truth will ever end. It may be the case that 
P can be kept true continuously by taking action on every other sense-act cycle, or even 
less often. The ability to represent continuously true conditions is provided by numerous 
temporal modelling approaches, but ours is the first one to allow that conditions may 
be kept continuously true by means of intermittent action, determining the frequency of 
the necessary action at plan execution time. 
When the operators soon and sust are composed, we obtain the crucial modality 
soon sust P, which is true at a given moment if, without further action being required 
(open-loop dynamics), it will eventually (still or again) be the case that P is true and 
can be kept that way. Conversely, soon sust P is false at a given moment when 
( 1) the UP. must perform some action to make P true in a sustainable way, regardless 
of whether P is temporarily true at any earlier time; or 
(2) P is already true and sustainable, but will become false or unsustainable unless 
the plan does something immediately. 
Nearly all of the goals occurring in the EVAR U.P. were of the form sust P and 
needed to be kept true for some period of time, either because several preconditions 
needed to be made true conjunctively (so that those achieved first had to stay true) or 
because actions were not instantaneous (and preconditions had to stay true throughout 
the action). For conditions of the form sust P our plan used 
( 7sust P A soon sust P) V (sust P A next sust P) 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for inaction. This formula is almost equivalent 
to soon sust P except that it demands action even when 
sust P A soon sust P /? Tnext sust P. 
Consequently soon sust P was a necessary and sufficient condition for inaction when 
sust P was being achieved, while next sust P was a necessary and sufficient condition 
for inaction when sust P was being maintained. (A pendulum repeatedly swinging 
through the desired end point should not count as sustainment.) 
This choice of formalization worked because our UP. had no interest in the specific 
amount of time before a desired condition would become true. In a more quantitative 
formalization, action might be desirable to speed up the attainment of an outcome that 
was already assured. 
We show in Section 4.5 how the achievement of modally qualified goals was opera- 
tionalized in our C code. 
3.4. Possible futures versus actual futures 
At this point it will be useful to address a potential misinterpretation of our formal- 
ization. Some readers express concern that, in the case where a robot is continually 
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acting, soon P implies the existence of futures in which the robot is initially not acting, 
whereas in fact such futures will not exist. This is a simple confusion between what is 
possible and what is actual. It is possible that through my inaction, the Little Nell who 
is lying on the train tracks will die in a few moments; it is also possible that I run and 
manage to save her. Indeed, the possibility of her dying is the reason for my running 
to save her, so that by acting, I remove from actuality exactly the possible future that 
motivated my acting [41]. Similarly, our UP is full of reaction to future possibilities 
that will be determinedly prevented. 
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the plan could find the possible open-loop 
futures to be desirable in certain respects, and could then perform an action which 
side-stepped those very futures. If those futures were being counted on to become real, 
however, this scenario would be a destructive interaction wherein a subgoal was being 
“clobbered” by a badly timed action. It is part of the task of any planner to prevent just 
such interactions. 
3.5. Encoding the EVAR domain 
In parallel with developing the C-language UP. we also used the modal logic ex- 
tensions to encode the EVAR domain. That representation made clear which effects 
were primitive, or derivable by inference, or conditional. For example, opening EVAR’s 
clamp has the primitive effect of the clamp’s being open, and has the derived effect 
that nothing is being held, and has the conditional effect that the astronaut being held 
has been delivered to the Space Station. These relationships between actions and effects 
were apparent in our C code. For derived effects the relevant deductions were encoded 
(see Fig. 6, line 72), and several effects were commented as being conditional. 
We are now developing a new UP interpreter and planner on top of a specially 
modified Prolog interpreter. The interpreter is now able to back-chain from modally 
qualified goals, testing exactly the same conditions and in the same order as our C- 
language UP (except for a few special cases commented as being “HACKS", see 
Section 7.2)) including that it can execute several subplans pseudo-concurrently. 
Figs. 2 and 3 show part of our modalized domain model. 
l By virtue of the axiom (k P > b P) , the first set of rules in Fig. 2 can be used to 
derive either knowledge or belief. 
l The domain constraint 
k located(X) -> k in-fov (X) . 
holds because an object can only be known to be located, at a given time, if it is be- 
ing perceived at that time, and it can only be perceived if it is in some sensor’s field 
of view. The corresponding rule for belief does not hold because the plan is entitled 
to have beliefs about an object’s location without that object being seen at the time. 
l Action descriptions are written action-name first, followed by goal-reduction rules 
in Prolog style, with postconditions on the left, a state transition arrow “<+” in the 
middle, and preconditions on the right. A “?” appearing among the preconditions 
separates the “qualifiers” preceding it from the “subgoals” following it. Both must 
be true to use the effect but qualifiers are not to be achieved when false; they serve 
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% rules for both knowledge & belief, forever 
clamp-open <-> - clamp_closed. 
facing(X) -> in_camera_fov(X). 
in_fov(X) i-> ( in_camera_fov(X) I in_laser_fov(X) >. 
in_fov(X) -> laserable( 
laserable -> located(X). 
% rules constraining knowledge, forever 
k located(X) -> k in_fov(X). 
k located(X) -> kw in_laser_fov(X). 
k located(X) -> kw in_camera_fovfX). 




in_laser_fov(X) <-> kw clamp-near(X). 
in_laser_fov(X) <-> kw standing_off(X). 
in_camera_fov(X) <-> kw low-spin(X). 
% some of the above hold for belief, forever 
b located(X) -> bw in_laser_fov(X). 
b located(X) -> bw in_camera_fov(X). 
% hence b located(X) -> bw in_fovo(). 
b in_fovo() -> bw facing(X). 
% eternal rules about persistence 
% the clamp never moves by itself 
b clamp-open -> b cant b clamp-open. 
b clamp_closed -> b cant b clamp_closed. 
% an inert object can't accelerate 
b low-spin(X) -> b cant b low-spin(X). 
b - low-spin(X) -> b cant b - low_spin(X). 
% the arm stays where it was put 
b arm-out -> b cant b arm-out. 
b - arm-out -> b cant b - arm-out. 
Fig. 2. Domain constraints for the EVA Retriever. 
only as applicability filters. Where “&&” separates two effects the second effect is a 
conditional effect, occurring only if the preconditions of both effects are satisfied. 
Conditional effects can be nested to any depth. Disjunctive effects are also allowed 
but are rarely used. 
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% action descriptions 
opening -- 
b next b 
&& b next b 
closing -- 
b next b 
&$ b next b 
% open the clamp 
clamp-open <+ true 
delivered(X,Y) <+ 
b coupled(X), b clamp-near(Y). 
“/o close the clamp 
clamp_closed <+ true 
coupled(X) <+ 
b clamp-open, b clamp-near(X). 
extending -- % extend arm with clamp 
b soon sust b arm-out <+ true. 
translatingl(X) -- % move to standoff 
b soon sust b standing-off(X) <+ b sust k located(X). 
translating2CX) -- % move to contact 
b soon sust b 
rotatingI -- % turn to look at X 
b soon sust b laserable <+ b located(X). 
rotating2CX) -- % turn to face X 
b soon sust b facing(X) <+ b located(X). 
rotating3CX) -- 
b soon sust b 
tracking(X) -- % track w range finder 
b soon sust b in_laser_fov(X) <+ b sust b laserable( 
get-status -- 
clamp_near(X) <+ 
b sust k low_spin(X) ? 
b sust k facing(X), 
b sust k standing_off(X), 
b sust b arm-out. 
% somersault 
in_camera_fov(X) <+ true. 
% read internal sensors 
b soon sust kw clamp-open, 
b soon sust kw arm-out <+ true. 
get-info(X) -- % get data from sensors 
b soon sust kw located(X) C+ true. 
Fig. 3. Action descriptions for the EVA Retriever. 
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l For all actions but the last two, the postconditions are free of knowledge modalities; 
the last two actions are knowledge-generating. 
l Preconditions of actions are qualified by a belief (or knowledge) modality, subject 
to the domain engineer’s view that each action may (or may not) be performed on 
the strength of unverified projections derived from earlier states. 
l The temporal modalities on action postconditions indicate both the expected delay 
until effects are achieved, and whether effects are achieved in a sustainable way. 
Almost all conditions in the EVAR domain had to be sustained. 
l The temporal modalities on action preconditions indicate whether preconditions 
must be true only initially or throughout the action. 
l Although GET-INFO(X) is described as achieving only b soon sust kw located(X) , 
the deduction rules provided enable our interpreter to use the GET-INFO(X) action 
to achieve all of the following goals: b soon sust kw in-camera-fov( X), b soon sust 
kw in-laser-fov(X), b soon sust kw in-fov(X), b soon sust kw laserable( and 
b soon sust kw facing(X). This deduction ability was one of the main motivations 
for the modal formalization. 
3.6. Using the formalism 
Fig. 4 shows a list of modal conjunctions and whether/how they can be simultaneously 
true. 
We now discuss several unusual aspects of our modal formalization. 
Preconditions are usually of the form sust P. Since the effects of actions are usu- 
ally delayed and of the form soon su.stTP, actions usually cannot “clobber” precondi- 
tions. 
From Fig. 5 it is clear that soon sustTP is consistent with sust P because the two 
sustainments can take place in different possible futures. This is not unreasonable, 
however. I recently mailed off a check that would have overdrawn my checking ac- 
count, thus achieving soon sust-sufficient-funds, and yet at the same time I intended 
sust sufficient-funds, as demonstrated by the fact that soon after mailing the check, I 
requested a 24-hour transfer from my savings to my checking account, thus preempt- 
ing the open-loop future I had set up. Observe that my preemption worked because the 
transfer process was much faster than the mailing process and was initiated early enough 
to be complete before the check was cashed. Also observe that the actual sequence of 
events paid my creditors more speedily than if I had delayed the mailing until after the 
transfer. 
Effects of the form soon susf7P are only possibly in conflict with a sustained pre- 
condition P: whether a conflict exists depends upon timing information not currently 
encoded by the modal formalism. Until the necessary timing information is available, 
our planner will treat merely possible conflicts as conflicts. This was also the spirit of 
TWEAK'S modal truth criterion [ 1 I 1. 
The second consequence of our use of the sust operator is that soon sust effects 
do not imply sust preconditions. There is no obvious solution to this particular prob- 
lem: at present we have preconditions that are not directly achievable by any action’s 
effects, but if action effects were strengthened to imply sustained preconditions, we 
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Fig. 4. Analysis of potential conflicts, 
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- = open-loop 
- = closed-loop 
b sust P 
A 
b sust P & 
b soon sust-,P & 
b soon sust P 
Fig. 5. Some interactions are not inconsistent. 
would get side-effect conflicts even if the effects were actually temporary and non- 
overlapping 
Thirdly, the appropriateness of using sust in preconditions is debatable. The intent on 
the knowledge engineer’s part is that b sust P appearing as a precondition should cause 
P to be not only sustainable but actually sustained. Our C plan and our UP. interpreter 
act accordingly, by achieving and maintaining b next sust P, and performing the action 
that required b sust P only when b sust P is also true, so that the plan actually achieves 
and maintains 
b sust P A b next sust P 
-which is the moment-by-moment way of keeping P true we discussed in Section 
3.3. However, making preconditions reflect this strengthened condition of being actually 
sustained only increases the logical gap between effects and preconditions. Since for all 
other purposes it is good enough to represent preconditions as requiring mere sustain- 
ability, we have chosen to define only one modal operator sust, meaning sustainable, 
and our C code and UP. interpreter simply do the right thing when actual sustainment 
is meant. 
Lest the reader think these problems arise from a poor choice of formalism, we point 
out that there is no other formalism for representing processes over time which distin- 
guishes open-loop futures, invokes intermittent action for maintaining desired conditions, 
and solves all the above problems. 
4. The U.P. implementation in C 
We now present both the operational and structural details of our U.P. for EVAR 
control, We begin by describing our implementation of indexical-functional reference, 
which determined what state estimate information was relevant at any time. Using that 
data, the UP. determined which goals and reactions were appropriate from moment to 
moment. In particular we describe how the UP monitored the dynamics of EVAR’s 
physical subsystems. Then we note that, since state estimates degrade over time, state 
estimate data are also a dynamic subsystem, and our UP. treated them as such. Finally 
we present the C macros used to construct the UP., and we exhibit a part of the 
plan. 
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4. I. tndexical-functional reference 
Indexical-functional reference was introduced by Agre and Chapman [1,2] and was 
adapted by Schoppers and Shu [58 1 for use in logic-based systems uch as U.P.s, as 
follows. Instead of building plans to manipulate representations of objects, we build 
plans to contain any number of indexical-functional variables which become associated 
with particular physical objects at plan execution time. In the EVAR U.I? implemen- 
tation, each such variable is in fact a pointer to a data record/struct hat contains 
information about where to find a physical object relative to EVAR. This information 
includes vectors for relative location, velocity, and acceleration estimates in EVAR’s 
body-centered coordinate system; an object type; and a numeric tag for communication 
with the NASA-supplied world state estimation module. At plan execution start-up the 
tags are null and the location vectors are zeroed. The plan can request from the NASA 
world state estimation module a list of tags for known physical objects, and can then 
request more information about the object identified by each tag. When data is obtained 
for an object identified as an astronaut, he plan can store the astronaut’s data into the 
appropriate variable’s data record. By regularly using the NASA-provided object tag to 
request updates from the NASA world state estimation module, the plan can ensure that 
it keeps track of where the object is. New data arriving from the NASA state estima- 
tion module simply replaces the old data in the existing record (this is handled by an 
interrupt service routine). 
The data record associated with a given variable is available to all predicates and 
actions which occur in the plan and take that variable as an argument. 
This mechanism qualifies as indexical-functional reference because ach variable ap- 
pearing in the plan is associated with a time- and body-relative (indexical) pointer 
into physical space. At any given moment a variable picks out, via its data record, one 
object being interacted with, and over time a variable can pick out any sequence of 
objects that satisfy the tests on the variable’s referent, such that the variable’s refer- 
ent is always “(the data about) the astronaut I am fetching” (functional), no matter 
how many other astronauts there are, nor how many are fetched over time. The U.I? 
does not remember anything about objects that aren’t relevant to its current activi- 
ties. 
Unfortunately, the NASA state estimation module remembers all the objects ever seen, 
identifies each object with a numeric tag, and forces our UP to use those tags when 
requesting tracking updates. This means both that our plan’s efficiency-conscious focus 
on particular physical objects is ignored by NASA’s software, and also that the plan’s 
indexical-functional variables range over NASA-provided object tracks rather than over 
physical objects (the U.I?‘s operation is indexical and functional nevertheless). The 
resulting indirection is transparent to most of the U.I? code; it matters only to the 
primitive actions that must use the object tags to request rack updates from the NASA 
software. 
The collection of data records associated with the plan’s indexical-functional variables, 
plus another ecord for robot-internal state, together comprise the “local real-valued state 
estimate” described in Section 3.3. 
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4.2. Monitoring dynamics 
The information stored in the data records associated with the plan’s variables is 
examined by C functions which evaluate such conditions as 
b soon sust b standing-off(X). 
Although the C code does not reason symbolically, it nevertheless depends crucially on 
our modal logic formalizations, as evidenced by such function names as 
b_soonsust_b_standing_of f (X) 
The soon P operator described in Section 3.3 evaluates whether P will become true 
by virtue of some open-loop dynamic. For example, if a door was standing open and 
there was a goal to have it be shut, b soon b door-shut would be false, inducing the 
U.P. to take an action like kicking the door. Thereafter, as long as the door continued 
to look like it would eventually be shut, b soon b door-shut would be true and no 
further action would be necessary. 
To elaborate on the door example, swing-doors can behave in nontrivial ways, such 
as: 
(a) slowly closing but never quite shutting; 
(b) closing completely, flying past the shut position, swinging to and fro a few times, 
and finally stopping still slightly open; or 
(c) swinging to and fro a few times before finally closing. 
These cases would be discriminated as follows. The b soon b door-shut test will 
come out true at the beginning of all three cases, since the door looks like it will 
eventually be shut, even if only momentarily. From there the test would (case (a) ) 
remain true until some time before the door stops moving, (case (b) ) remain true until 
some time after the last door-closing, and (case (c) ) remain true until, and as long as, 
the door remains closed. The exact moment at which the test becomes false in cases 
(a) and (b) depends on the precision of the model being used to predict the door’s 
open-loop motion. 
In the EVAR domain, our U.P. cares not just about the momentary truth of things, 
but about their ongoing truth. For such cases we defined the sust P (“sustainable”) 
operator. How sust b door-shut is interpreted depends on the application. Suppose 8 
is the variable to be controlled, namely the angle between the door and its shut position, 
and so define b door-shut G (0 = 0). If a U.P. is not allowed to cause a robot to 
intercept a moving door, then we must define 
b sust b door-shut- (f?=Or\s=O), 
i.e. the door must be both closed and at rest before the UP can conclude that the door 
can be kept shut. If however the robot is allowed to intercept moving doors, we can 
define 
b sust b door-shut z (0 = 0), 
for then the robot can stop the door at the exact moment when it is shut. In the 
EVAR domain, the kinetic energies involved were too large to allow interceptions, so 
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sustainability generally required 6 M 0, and here we proceed with that interpretation. 
Then it follows that b soon sust b door-shut is true just in case the UP. observes 
that the door’s state (0,6,8) is consistent with the eventual truth of (8 = 0 A 6 = 0). 
To implement such a test we would model open-loop door motion with a second-order 
differential equation, solve the equation to obtain a closed-form expression for the door’s 
trajectory, plug in the desired end state, solve for a criterion on the antecedent motion, 
and encode the resulting criterion as a C function. It was never necessary to make the 
UP. explicitly model possible futures. 
Reconsidering cases (a)-(c) above, we see that unlike the b soon b door-shut 
test, the b soon sust b door-shut test may come out false at the beginning of 
cases (a) and (b), because the door motion model may be precise enough to detect, 
even before the door has swung through the shut position once, that the door will 
finally remain slightly open. In case (c) the b soon sust b door-shut test will still 
be true from beginning to end, but now it is true at the beginning because the door 
will eventually remain shut, not because the door is about to swing through the shut 
position. 
Our UP for controlling EVAR took action to achieve all goals b sust Q for which 
b soon sust Q was false. To push the swing-door example to its breaking point: 
b soon sust b door-shut being false would induce the UP. to somehow apply a 
small acceleration 8 to the door, thus modifying the door’s motion just enough to make 
the door, several swings later, come to a halt (6 = 0) at the precise moment when the 
door was also closed (0 = 0). After observing the door’s new motion, the UP. would 
find b soon sust b door-shut to be true and would, long before the door stopped 
swinging, deem further action against the door unnecessary. 
4.3. State estimates as dynamic subsystems 
The distinction between open-loop and closed-loop dynamics bears directly on the 
issue of how often to sense something. An agent’s beliefs about current environmental 
state can be viewed as a dynamical system whose open-loop dynamics have to do with a 
decay of accuracy and/or certainty over time. If an agent’s beliefs about environmental 
state are subject to decay, and if those same beliefs must be maintained for plan execution 
purposes, then the plan is faced with a situation that is exactly analogous to an opening 
door that should be forced shut. Then, one appropriate response is to resort to a closed- 
loop dynamic, e.g. by occasionally updating the decaying information. 
In congruence with the encoding of effector goals, the UP. encoded knowledge 
goals-conditions of the form b sust kw P-with correspondingly named C func- 
tions, i.e. b_sust_kwJ(), and monitored their dynamics with the expected supporting 
C functions, b_soonsustkw_P() and bnextsust_kw9(). However, since achiev- 
ing a knowledge goal consisted only of sending an update request to the NASA state 
estimation module and receiving a reply containing the requested data, there was noth- 
ing to watch to evaluate satisfactory progress. In such cases the bsoonsustkw90 
function was purely a function of time, evaluating to true for I or 2 seconds after 
transmission of the update request, and remaining true only if the requested data was 
received. 
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Some time after reception of the requested data, b_soonsust-kw_PO would become 
false again to force another update. The period over which knowledge could be sustained 
depended on the nature of the knowledge. Knowledge of the position of other objects 
lasted a few seconds; knowledge of the positions of the robot’s effecters lasted until 
those effecters were moved. 
4.4. A referential subtlety 
All object positions were calculated in a body-centered coordinate system that trans- 
lated and rotated with EVAR. This was done so that EVAR would not be dependent 
on an external coordinate system obtainable only via a breakable radio link. It was 
also convenient for controlling EVAR’s effecters. However, it also generated some sur- 
prises. 
The C function blaserablecazim, elev) could compare the given azimuth and 
elevation with the current pan and tilt of the laser scanner, and so could determine 
whether the given direction was currently visible. Since the given direction was body- 
relative, this function was unaffected by any rotation of EVAR’s body. The function 
b-sust-b-laserable (azim, elev) , on the other hand, tested the sustained visibility of 
the “absolute” direction that was aligned with the given relative direction at the moment 
the function was called. If EVAR was rotating, that “absolute” direction might not remain 
visible for long. To be consistent we then mentally redefined b_laserable (azim, elev) 
to test the momentary visibility of the “absolute” direction picked out by the given 
relative direction. This produced a paradox: if EVAR was rotating, repeated calls to 
blaserable (0 ,O> could return true forever, while yet b_sust_blaserable (O,O> 
correctly returned false. The paradox is resolved by noting that each successive call to 
blaserable (O,O) would be referring to a different “absolute” direction. 
4.5. Operationalizing goal achievement 
The EVAR UP. was constructed by means of a small number of macros. These 
macros were defined specifically to ensure that our hand-coding of goal achievement 
and monitoring would comply with our modal logic formalization. This section provides 
a complete list of the macros used by the EVAR UP. 
We distinguish macros according to the type of precondition they achieve and moni- 
tor. Preconditions can be either momentary or sustained, with the obvious meaning; and 
they can be knowledge preconditions, effector preconditions, or combined preconditions. 
Knowledge preconditions achieve kw P and change the UP’s knowledge, effector pre- 
conditions achieve b P and change the external world, combined preconditions achieve 
k P and change both. 
In these macros, the pseudo-action NO-OP does exactly nothing, while the pseudo- 
action busy=1 sets a flag to indicate that the plan has not yet achieved the desired 
preconditions/subgoals. When set, this flag can be used to inhibit the achievement 
of later preconditions, and will certainly inhibit execution of the action having the 
unsatisfied preconditions. Actions are finally executed when none of the macros around 
their preconditions set the busy flag. 
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( 1) Instead of directly achieving a momentary knowledge precondition kw P of action 
A, the plan actually achieves b soon kw P, thus inherently exploiting any relevant 
open-loop dynamics. Nevertheless, the action A of which kw P is a precondition 
can only be performed when the original precondition kw P is true-at-the-time. 
The appropriate macro is: 
kw P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: b soon kw P ? 
T: busy=1 % wait for kw P 
F: busy=l, ACHIEVE b soon kw P 
(2) The macro for achieving a momentary efector precondition b P is similar to 
macro #I, but with kw P replaced by b P throughout. 
(3) To achieve a momentary combined precondition k P of action A, the plan utilized 
the equivalence 
kPrkwPAbP 
which makes clear that achievement of knowledge of P may require several 
inter-dependent actions, namely 
l perceiving whether P is perhaps already true before anything has been done, 
l acting to make P true, and 
l perceiving whether P has successfully been made true. 
Exploiting any relevant open-loop dynamics, the complete macro became a 
straightforward nesting of macros #I and #2: 
kw P ? 
T: {bP? % b P subtree 
T: NO-OP %=kP 
F: b soon b P ? 
T: busy=1 % wait for b P 
F: busy=l, ACHIEVE b soon b P 
3 
F: b soon kw P ? 
T: busy=1 % wait for kw P 
F: busy=l, ACHIEVE b soon kw P 
This nesting allows for action to achieve P only when P is known to need 
achieving (kw P A -b P E klP). 
(4) Instead of directly achieving a sustained knowledge precondition b sust kw P of 
action A, the plan actually achieves b soon sust kw P, thus inherently exploiting 
any relevant open-loop dynamics. Nevertheless, the action A of which b sust 
kw P is a precondition can only be performed when the original precondition 
b sust kw P is true-at-the-time (assuming disturbance-free controllability). Fur- 
thermore, in order to perform the action A that requires the truth of b sust kw P 
and simultaneously act to sustain kw P, the plan may have to do several things 
in parallel. Consequently, we defined the following macro: 
202 
t b sust kw P ? 
T: b next sust kw P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust kw P 
F: f busy=1 % delay A until b sust kw P 
I I 
b soon sust kw P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust kw P 
1 ) 
The “1 I” denotes parallel performance of busy=1 with the lower decision frag- 
ment. Since the busy flag is not set when b sust kw P is true, the action requiring 
b sust kw P and the action sustaining it can be running simultaneously. 
(5) The macro for achieving a sustained effector precondition b sust b P is similar 
to macro #4, but with kw P replaced by b P throughout. 
(6) To achieve a sustairzed combined precondition b sust k P of action A, the plan 
again utilized the equivalence 
kPrkwPAbP. 
The complete macro became a straightforward composition of macros #4 and 
#.5: 
b sust kw P ? 
T: { b next sust kw P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust kw P 
I I 
{ b sust b P ? 
T: b next sust b P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust b P 
F: { busy=1 
% wait for b sust b P 
I I 
b soon sust b P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust b P 
11 1 
F: { busy=1 
% wait for b sust kw P 
I I 
b soon sust kw P ? 
T: NO-OP 
F: ACHIEVE b soon sust kw P 
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This macro has twice the parallelism of macro #4. In particular, when 
b sust kw P A lb soon sust kw P A 
b sust b P A lb soon sust b P 
this macro allows the plan to do all of the following in parallel: 
l checking beliefs about sensory information about P (b sust kw P), 
l acting to sense the current truth value of P (achieving b soon sust kw P), 
l checking beliefs about P itself (b sust b P), 
l acting to sustain the truth of P (achieving b soon sust b P), 
l performing the action having b sust P as precondition, 
and furthermore, these things may be happening simultaneously for all the other 
preconditions conjoined with P, and for all the supergoals of P, and even for 
preconditions in unrelated parts of the plan. While this much parallelism is not 
necessary, it is efficient and is permitted in the absence of destructive interactions 
between activities. 
(7) There are also a couple of macros for testing what we have called the qualifiers 
of actions-the preconditions that act as applicability filters but whose falsehood 
should not cause attempts to make them true. The macro for testing a momentary 
qualifier k P is: 
kw P ? 
T: b P ? 
T: NO-OP %=kP 
F: REJECT % don’t allow A 
F: b soon kw P ? 
T: busy=1 % wait for kw P 
F: busy=l, ACHIEVE b soon kw P 
This can be seen to be similar to the macro for achieving momentary knowledge, 
except that achieving b soon P has been replaced by a rejection of the action A 
whose qualifier is being evaluated. In the C version of the UP there was only 
one way to achieve each goal, and REJECT could be implemented as busy=i. In 
the more general UP interpreter, a rejection of one candidate action results in 
backtracking to find another. 
(8) The macros for testing other qualifiers are similarly related to their counter- 
parts for achieving preconditions, namely, actions to achieve physical effects 
are replaced by REJECT. We are still debating whether this approach is correct. 
Qualifiers may currently initiate sensing actions whose preconditions may in turn 
initiate physical motions to enable the sensing. Stricter interpretations of quali- 
fiers might prohibit all physical actions, or might prohibit all action. We have not 
yet encountered a situation that clearly forces one of the stricter interpretations, 
in part because there were few qualifiers in the EVAR domain. 
For pedagogical purposes it is convenient to derive the macros for combined precon- 
ditions (#3 and #6) from those for knowledge and effector preconditions (#I, #2, #4, 
#5) as above. By virtue of some theorems of the modal logics of knowledge and belief, 
the reverse derivations are also possible. If we set P = kw Q and use the reductions 
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kw P E kw kw Q z true 
and 
bPrbkwQzkwQ 
in macro #3, we recover macro #I; using them in macro #6 we recover macro #4. 
Similarly, if we set P = b Q and use the reductions 
kw P z kw b Q s true 
and 
bPEbbQrbQ 
in macro #3, we recover macro #2; using them in macro #6 we recover macro #5. Thus, 
of macros #l-#6, only macros #3 and #6 are strictly necessary. 
4.6. Example of a subplan 
Here we present a piece of the final C-language U.P. for EVAR control. The complete 
UP differs in being larger; in having less transparent names for some of its subplans; in 
the fact that the marker-bound subplan was not primitive; and in including functions for 
testing goal-related modal conditions as described in Section 4.2. The SUST-K-MACRO 
refers to macro #6 exhibited above. 
The code in Fig. 6 implements a subplan for grappling with an astronaut. The topmost 
goal of the subplan is to become coupled to the astronaut. This goal is invoked by an 
endless loop (line 3). On each iteration, the U.P. tests a number of conditions, determines 
what response is appropriate (if any), and exits. For example, if the top-level call to 
susTX~ACRo(coupled(X)) finds that b sust b coupled(X) and b next sust 
b coupled(X) are true, then the function achnextsust_b_coupled(X) is not even 
entered. On the next iteration, of course, the astronaut may have escaped, and then 
achnextsust_b_coupled(X) would be entered. 
The achnext_sust_b_coupled(X) function (line 4) is an encoding of a condi- 
tional effect: if the world is set up so that the robot’s clamp is in the right place 
relative to the astronaut, then closing the clamp will catch the astronaut. “Setting 
up the world” in this case means-in any order, or in parallel-bringing the clamp 
near the astronaut, facing the astronaut, and having the clamp open. The call to 
SUST_K_MACRO(clamp_near(X)) on line 7 may invoke none, one, or both of the 
functions ach_soon-sust_kw_clampnear (X) and achsoonsust_b_clampnear (X) , 
depending on how the various tests come out in the course of executing 
SUSTK_MACRO(clamp_near(X)); and similarly for the calls on lines 8 and 9. If any 
of the six conditions b sust b clampnear( b sust kw clamp_near(X), b sust 
b approx_facing( X), b sust kw approx_facing(X), b sust b clamp-open, or b sust 
kw clamp-open evaluates to false the SUST_K_MACRO will set busy=1 and the SERI- 
ALtZE macro at line 10 will cause an exit. Only when all six preconditions have been 
achieved will the SERIALIZE macro allow performance of a clamp closing action. In 
sum, when achnextsust_b_coupled(X) exits it may or may not have invoked any of 
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1 #define SUBGOALS int busy = 0 
2 #define SERIALIZE if (busy) return 
3 while (1) SUST_K_MACRO(coupled(X)); 
4 ach_next_sust_b_coupled(marker X> 
5 C SUBGOALS; 


















/* deduction: if we know arm pos and 
/* and pos, kw_clamp_near follows, so 

















29 ach_soon_sust_kw_percepts_of(marker X) 
30 { /* either there are fresh percepts, or 
31 /* not, so kw_percepts must be true, & 












/* deduction: if X is in FOV there are 
/* fresh percepts, so there's nothing 
/* else to achieve */ 
3 
Fig. 6. Simplified version of part of current grappling plan. 
41 ach_soon_sust_kw_estimate_of(marker X> 
42 _C /* either there's an estimate, or not, 
43 /* so kw_estimate_of must be true, so 
44 /* this subplan will never be used. */ 
45 1 










/* we have a tag for the object, so.. */ 
get-info-on(X); 
53 ach_soon_sust_kw_in_laser_fov(marker X> 
54 ( SUBGOALS; 
55 SUST_K_MACRO(robot_status); 
56 SUST_K_MACRO(estimate_of(X)); 
57 /* deduction: if there's a new estimate 
58 /* we can tell if the laser is looking 
59 /* there; if there's an old one we know 
60 /* X is not in view; so after the two 
61 /* subgoals there's nothing to achieve */ 
62 1 
63 ach_soon_sust_b_in_laser_fov(marker X> 

















/* deduction: since <Azim,Elev> is a 
/* direction relative to the robot 
/* right now, the robot's current mo- 
/* tion determines whether the laser 
/* can keep that dir'n in sight. */ 
1 
Fig. 6. Simplified version of part of current grappling plan (continued) 
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78 ach_soon_sust_b_laserable(float Azim,Elev) 





84 ach_soon_sust_kw_marker_bound(marker X> 
85 { /* kw_marker_bound(X) tests whether X 
86 /* is now associated with a tag. it is 
87 /* or it isn't, so kw_marker_bound(X) 
88 /* is true and this subplan will never 
89 /* be used. */ 
90 1 
91 ach_soon_sust_b_marker_bound(marker X> 





Fig. 6. Simplified version of part of current grappling plan (continued) 
the six relevant subplans, and may or may not have performed a clamp closing action. 
If any of the six relevant subplans were invoked, then they, in turn, might or might not 
have invoked other subplans to achieve their preconditions. All the same options arise 
again in the next iteration of the UP 
In the U.l? fragment shown here, all preconditions happen to be achievable in parallel. 
The SERIALIZE macro may also appear between preconditions, in which case false 
preconditions preceding it can prevent even the testing of preconditions appearing after 
it. 
5. Capabilities of the formalism 
5. I. Active vision 
The kw modal operator allows us to give effector actions preconditions that require 
sensing, and also allows us to represent sensing actions, which can then be given effector 
preconditions. Thus we have enabled arbitrary inter-dependence of sensing and acting. 
A prime example from the EVAR UP is (refer to Fig. 6) : 
l Grabbing an astronaut (acting, line 11) , requires (line 7) : 
l Knowing how far away she is (deduction, line 17), which requires (line 16): 
l Knowing where she is (deduction, line 37), which requires (line 36) : 
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l Knowing whether the laser range finder is seeing her (deduction, line 57), which 
requires (line 56) : 
l Having a location estimate (sensing, line 51), which requires (line 48): 
l Having seen the astronaut in the first place, if necessary performing a physical 
search by tumbling the whole robot body (action, line 95), which requires (line 
93): 
l Proprioception (sensing, not shown). 
Our plan enables eye-to-hand coordination in the sense that the perceived positions of 
particular objects are continuously used to control body motion. Among other examples, 
our UP. supports and uses visual tracking, which is built into the NASA-provided 
software as a closed loop from laser scanner input to laser gimbal control. Our U.P. 
initiates and monitors the execution of the relevant software. 
Our U.P. also enables hand-to-eye coordination in the sense that the body can be 
controlled to make desired percepts available. Our existing UP does not provide for 
active perception in the sense of acting to simplify the perception process itself, unless 
the required motion can be induced via a precondition on a sensing action. 
Active perception researchers’ interest in attentional mechanisms is addressed by 
Section 5.2. 
5.2. Tas.k-directed attention 
It is sometimes thought that “classical” planners require “complete” information about 
the initial state; that execution monitoring of action-ordered plans is similarly afflicted; 
and that U.P.s have the same problem. The first assertion is correct, the last two are 
mistaken. 
For action-ordering planners the entire initial state must be known (as represented), 
to allow the planner to simulate the effects of arbitrary action sequences on that state. 
For plan execution, even of action-ordered plans, it is necessary to know only the 
bare minimum that will allow performance of the next action, namely the truth of that 
action’s preconditions. That much is usually a very small subset of a “complete” world 
state. Some plan execution systems additionally want to know, before performing some 
actions, that those actions are still needed, so may examine a small number of extra 
conditions, as in triangle tables [ 2 I]. 
UP. execution similarly involves checking the preconditions of the actions being 
performed next (in parallel), plus some verification that all those actions are still needed. 
This too is usually a small subset of a world state. UPS differ most significantly 
from earlier technology in two respects: all the potentially relevant sensing actions are 
automatically incorporated as an integral part of the plan, and UPS can be synthesized 
automatically without requiring the planner to assume any initial state at all [ 531. 
The fact that sensing actions are incorporated only when they are demanded by 
knowledge preconditions means that the set of conditions being sensed changes as 
the current activity changes. Hence UPS embody a dynamic perceptual focus. This 
focus has been present since the earliest exposition of U.P.s [52], awaiting only the 
formalization of sensing actions [ 561 to enact it. An analysis of the sensory bandwidth 
of UP execution was given in [54], along with implications for the engineering of 
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reactive and/or intelligent software. 
5.3. EfJicient perceptual experiments 
When the EVAR state estimation subsystem projects the motion of a previously seen 
object forward to the present under orbital dynamics, the resulting prediction of object 
location is considered a belief by our UP., and the UP is defined so that a believed 
position is sufficient basis for pointing the laser scanner at that position (rotating the 
robot’s body as necessary). If the object is seen near where it was expected, its location 
then becomes “known”. If it is not seen its location becomes unknown, the previous 
location-belief is cancelled, and the UP. reacts to the absence of that belief by resorting 
to a visual search. (This search is from the robot’s current location, we did not implement 
search procedures involving locomotion other than body rotation.) 
The predicted location serves as heuristic guidance toward efficient behavior. If the 
prediction is accurate enough a relatively time-consuming visual search can be avoided, 
and otherwise the predicted location would be scanned anyway. 
The plan’s behavior amounts to a perceptual experiment to determine the veracity of 
the predicted location. From the plan representation viewpoint this particular experiment 
is very much like the perceptual verification of the expected effects of attempted actions. 
5.4. Monitoring helpful dynamics 
Predicates of the form b soon P (where P was usually sust b Q) were implemented 
as C functions that applied tests to the current estimate of the world state and its time- 
derivatives. It bears emphasizing that the truth of these conditions was monitored, not 
assumed, see Section 4.2. Since the b soon P tests usually came out true far in advance 
of P itself being true, the U.P. spent much of its time just watching, see Section 6.3. 
5.5. Forestalling unhelpful dynamics 
Progress monitoring continued after desired conditions had been achieved, when it 
verified continued success. Action could be initiated when the desired condition itself 
was true but was about to become false, e.g. when the astronaut being rescued was 
about to drift out of the laser scanner’s field of view. 
A special example of preventive action forestalled loss of access to a current world 
state estimate. State estimates (“knowledge”) were considered valid for a limited amount 
of time. When that time was about to expire, the action to forestall the imminent loss 
of knowledge consisted of sending off a request for an update. 
In all cases of preventive action, the setback was considered imminent if current 
inaction would not leave enough time for successful preventive action, although the 
setback itself might be quite some time away. This test of imminence was encapsulated 
in the C functions implementing the next P predicates. 
Certain cases of preventive action were not solved in the most general way due to 
subsystem interactions, see Section 7.3. 
5.6. Purallel activities 
The large amount of potential parallelism in U.P.s was used to good effect. For 
example, before actually grappling an astronaut the robot was required to “stand off” 
the astronaut at a short distance and for some time. This served both as extra precaution 
against collisions, and as time available for obtaining a good estimate of the astronaut’s 
rotational motion. During stand-off the robot was required to be directly facing the 
astronaut and to have its arms out in case the astronaut could take the initiative. Hence, 
along the way to achieving a stand-off, the plan simultaneously 
l accelerated into the astronaut’s orbit, 
l rotated the robot body to face the astronaut, 
l tracked the astronaut with the laser scanner, 
l opened the grappling clamp, and 
l refreshed its state estimate information. 
In principle it would be possible for the goals of rotating the body and tracking the 
astronaut to conflict, since the laser scanner platform had a limited kinematic range 
and its use could require body rotations. This was dealt with by implementing all the 
astronaut-related body rotations so that they tumbled the robot about the same axes, 
differing only in the angle to be rotated. In this way, rotating to precisely face the 
astronaut prior to grappling would also satisfy the goal of rotating to approximately fact 
the astronaut during approach, as well as the goal of rotating to track the astronaut with 
the laser scanner. The more “relaxed” orientation goals would be achieved first, leaving 
the more precise goals to demand additional rotation. (The body rotation for searching 
visible space was an exception.) 
6. Underlying principles 
As documented in the previous sections, our distinctions between estimated/believed 
and perceived/known information, together with the ability to hold beliefs about ex- 
pccted behavior under open- and closed-loop dynamics, allowed the construction of a 
U.I? in which sensing, estimating, acting and timing supported each other in sophisticated 
ways. 
This section presents some lessons we learned and were able to test. Section 7 
discusses issues we encountered and did not resolve satisfactorily. 
6.1. The controlled system: robot hardware, software, and beliefs 
In considerations of dynamics it is important to be clear about the location of the 
boundary between the controlling and controlled systems. We began our work under the 
influence of “embodied agent” discussions, assuming that the controlling system was 
the robot and the controlled system was the space environment. We ended-after having 
completed the UP-with the realization that we had built something else: as far as the 
UP was concerned, the robot body and its servo loops were just another part of the 
world. 
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The most surprising aspect of this realization was that the information being managed 
by the plan, namely the plan’s local copy of the robot’s world state estimate, was also 
part of the controlled system, and had an open-loop dynamic causing it to diffuse over 
time. The appropriate response was of course to replace that unwanted dynamic with 
a closed-loop dynamic, by intermittently requesting updates from NASA’s world state 
estimation module. The plan was doing the right thing before we properly understood 
what it was doing. 
From our point of view “the controller” ultimately consisted only of our UP., a few 
implementation-specific flags, and some bits to encode past activity (e.g. the phase 
of the visual search, how long ago certain activities were initiated, whether certain 
processes had been monitored continuously since initiation, and in some cases the last 
command sent to a robot subsystem). The controller contained no bits for encoding the 
current state of anything outside the UP.; all such information was part of the controlled 
system. 
4.2. Synchronous belief checking, asynchronous subsystems 
As noted in Section 6.1 the controlling system consists of little more than the executing 
UP., while the controlled system consists of the robot hardware, its servo loops, aspects 
of the space environment, and even the plan’s beliefs about present and future world 
state. It follows that our architecture does not fit very well into either of the well-known 
architectural categories for intelligent embedded agents-the synchronous sense-plan- 
act architecture [ 391 and the asynchronous-monitoring-and-acting architecture [ 351. 
If we consider the controller to consist of the III? only, then it is best described 
as a sense-act cycle wherein sensing means examining state estimates, and acting 
means instantaneously re-parameterizing subsystems. If we consider all software as 
part of the controller, then the architecture is closest to those recently proposed by 
[ 7,251, wherein a reactor contains servo loops, subsumption-style behaviors, and small 
UPS; a sequencer coordinates and configures potentially concurrent reactions; and a 
deliberator selects tasks and constructs plans. A similar architecture was developed on 
information-theoretic grounds in [ 5 1,611, comprised of execution, coordination, and 
management/organization levels. Our U.I? for EVAR control belongs at the middle 
level. (Consequently U.I?s have now been successfully demonstrated in two of the three 
layers.) 
Our architecture can also be compared to the NASREM architecture [ 31 as follows: in 
both, higher levels synchronously coordinate asynchronous subsystems, and subsystem 
capabilities are fixed at design time; but our architecture currently contains only two 
levels, and communicates subsystem parameters as well as subsystem goals. 
6.3. Relying on dynamics without ignoring disturbances 
A reasonably useful vision of our U.I? is to see it as a bedouin in an undulating desert 
criss-crossed with trails, being pulled along by a loosely coordinated camel train. The 
bedouin can see a short distance ahead, knows when there are choices to be made, can 
use the locally visible landscape to navigate, and from long experience knows which 
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choices lead to the next oasis. Occasionally, some camel will either try to wander off 
on its own or try to lie down, and hence will need to be curbed, but most of the time 
there is nothing for the bedouin to do besides glance around intermittently while the 
temporal landscape glides by, effortlessly and inevitably. 
Each camel in the train represents a subsystem operating under its own dynamics. 
The UP’s job is to bend the pre-existing subsystem dynamics to a specific coordinated 
purpose. To successfully manipulate a dynamic (viewed as a function from initial to 
successor states) the U.P. must know the corresponding “inverse dynamic”, namely, what 
initial states/conditions induce the dynamic to produce the final conditions desired by the 
U.P. A subsystem need not be aware that it is being manipulated: the mere existence of 
an “invertible” dynamic is sufficient to allow effective manipulation. Manipulable initial 
conditions include subsystem parameters such as target positions, maximum velocities, 
and amounts of available resources, as well as external circumstances like getting the 
robot’s clamp near an astronaut body part before the clamp-closing dynamic is enabled. 
Observe that the plan’s actions are instantaneous, generally serving only to change 
parameters of subsystem dynamics, while the subsystem controllers and the processes 
they affect carry the plan along its chosen trails. From the plan’s point of view, the 
subsystems are largely open-loop: give them suitable initial conditions and they’ll do 
the desired thing by themselves in good time. (Leave some cheese in a mouse trap, and 
the mouse will trap itself.) 
All this can be done, and the end goal reached, purely reactively, i.e. the plan can 
react to its current temporal vicinity and its knowledge of what comes next, without ever 
explicitly visualizing (symbolically constructing) any part of the desired path. (Many 
people born in Pittsburgh can drive infallibly all over town using landmarks, but can 
neither reliably describe their routes nor reliably relate them to a street map.) 
The key ingredients in the UP’s ability to exploit dynamics are predicates of the form 
b next sust P and b soon sust P. By virtue of their veto power on corrective action, 
these tests had better be right about the subsystems’ expected behavior, for the price of 
being too confident is that an effector will arrive in the wrong place or at the wrong 
speed. In the worst case, when b soon sust P remains true and b sust P remains false, 
the plan can be misled to wait forever. 
Disturbances can be small, just large enough to move an effector off its ideal trajectory, 
as when a thruster hiccups, or they can be so large that the plan needs to initiate an 
entirely new set of activities, as when a previously caught astronaut escapes. U.I?s 
recover easily from large disturbances, which were a driving factor in the invention of 
UPS. A sufficiently large change of context will cause the plan’s predicates to evaluate 
the current state differently, and so will lead to very different choices of action. Small 
disturbances, however, under poorly designed b soon sust P predicates, could induce 
the endless waiting just mentioned. Hence these predicates are also key ingredients in 
the ability to compensate for small disturbances. 
Beyond the obvious solution of implementing the b soon sust P predicates to carefully 
monitor and cautiously project the robot’s motions (see Section 4.2), a very reliable 
solution would be to build time limits into all b soon sust P predicates, causing them to 
become false eventually whether or not the controlled subsystem was thought to be still 
“on track” at the time. This would force the plan to re-initiate all overdue processes by 
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giving them new target positions. (We did not need to try this, choosing instead to get 
our b soon sust P predicates right.) 
6.4. On impossible vents, inertia, and reactivity 
In control systems, a special class of disturbance is the injection of sensor noise 
and/or error in state estimation. In real-valued control systems, such disturbances are 
handled by means of frequent updating and action reselection. We have come to the 
same approach, which might be paraphrased paradoxically as: if your perception is 
unreliable, rely on it often. There is also more to be said about the roles of inertia and 
reactivity. 
If the state of the world reported by a perception subsystem is not guaranteed to be 
an accurate portrayal of reality, then it follows that the perception subsystem may also 
report state sequences (i.e. events) that could not occur in reality. Our favorite example 
of this was an observed astronaut who was seen to turn into a space station window. 
Another example is of objects transferring from one orbit into a non-intersecting one 
with apparently massive expenditures of energy, although the objects were unpowered- 
this phenomenon occurred when a Kalman filter found objects on the edge of their 
positional uncertainty envelope. 
An agent’s “inertia” against believing perceived impossible events can be beneficial, 
or not, if the state estimate prior to the impossible event was (respectively) correct, 
or not. Observe that in the case of the astronaut turning into a window, believing the 
perceived impossible event was beneficia1 (the initial state estimate was incorrect). We 
came to the conclusion that it was better for the state estimator to accept what it thought 
it was seeing, thus to be right on average, than to stand on principle (“astronauts can’t 
turn into windows”) and thus risk being very wrong indefinitely. 
If there is any way to judge the value of accepting an impossible event, such a 
judgment must be based on other information already available in the state estimation 
module (e.g. belief strengths before and after the event) and the state estimation module 
is the right module to make the judgment. Therefore, a reasonable way to design reactive 
agents is have the state estimation module determine the appropriate amount of “inertia”, 
and allow the action selection module to react quickly to whatever interpretation the 
state estimation module selects, even if that means reacting to an impossible sequence 
of states. This is the approach taken by Universal Plans. 
It follows that any agent designer who makes assumptions about what events will 
be perceived, and who makes a control system design or implementation dependent on 
such assumptions, may be responsible for a disaster. Unfortunately, being endowed with 
excellent perception systems, people very easily fall into this trap. Worse, people are 
not very good at imagining impossible events, nor are they naturally inclined toward the 
labor of constructing exhaustive lists of perceptually unlikely events. 
In view of these understandable shortcomings of human designers, it is important 
to provide robotic controllers with automated support for dealing with the supposedly 
impossible. Under the UP approach the solution is to design the controller in such a 
way that assumptions of impossibility have nowhere to hide: by virtue of their reliance 
on dynamic classification of perceived world states, U.P.s begin with no restrictions 
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on possible courses of events and demand effort to impose restrictions. This contrasts 
with many previous approaches to discrete-event control systems design, wherein state 
sequences or procedures are primitive, so that enlarging the set of possible futures adds 
to the workload, e.g. [ I8,22.24,26.34,44]. 
6.5. The Rapid Feedback Priwiplp 
If sensors are noisy and foolable, and if algorithms for interpreting sensor data can be 
wrong even about perfect data, how can an embedded agent “know” anything through 
perception’? A novel answer is proposed by Rosenschein [48], who considers belief 
states (or bit states) of an agent to be encoding knowledge of a fact if-and-only- 
if, whenever the agent is in the relevant states, the encoded fact is really true (this 
finds “knowledge” not within the agent but in a correlation between agent states and 
environment states). To engineer a “knowing” agent under this view, noisy sensors must 
be compensated for by very cautious sensor interpretation. The embedded agent is then 
likely to err by refusing to believe things that are true. In the astronaut rescue domain, 
where windows or other objects may be mistaken for astronauts, these considerations 
reveal a cruel dilemma: should perception be so cautious in its professions of knowledge 
that the robot could stare at an astronaut with disbelieving eyes even as she died for 
lack of oxygen, or should perception be less skeptical and perhaps cause the robot to 
chase a perceived astronaut while the real astronaut died somewhere else? 
The notion of “knowledge” embedded in our actual work is: model-based predictions, 
perceptually corroberated. This notion applies very nicely to observations of object 
positions, which can be predicted under orbital motion; to effector motions, which 
are voluntary; and even to object recognition, which utilizes previous observations as 
predictions for later ones. Even so, EVAR’s so-called “knowledge” may intermittently 
be wrong. 
One of the surprises emerging from our work is that for EVAR, misinterpretation of 
sensor data seems not to matter very much. EVAR’s state estimation software invariably 
corrects itself, and in the vast majority of cases perceptual mistakes last for only a 
fraction of a second. The U.P. representation recovers so rapidly, even from the apparent 
perception of physically impossible events, that momentary misperceptions have no 
humanly noticeable effect on the robot’s behavior. Consequently, here too it was better 
to be right on average, and to act on possibly mistaken beliefs, than to wait for certainty. 
Nevertheless, there clearly are situations in which a perceptual mistake could become 
extremely serious. What makes mistakes serious, and what makes domains unforgiving? 
An obvious difficulty is the impossibility of recovering, or more generally, the cost 
of recovering, given that sometimes the cost is infinite. Since the control system is 
by hypothesis unable to know exactly what the world’s state is, a state estimate is a 
probability distribution over possible states; then a small probability times an infinite cost 
is still a disaster. However, having the robot do nothing for fear of pursuing the wrong 
thing also leads to disaster, and even the time required to get a better state estimate 
may mean disaster. When all the available courses of action may lead to infinitely bad 
consequences, utility theory breaks down, but the robot can still act to minimize the 
probability of failure. 
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Considerations like these lead to the following insight, which we call the “Rapid 
Feedback Principle”: 
a domain containing infinitely bad disasters can yet be forgiving if the domain 
provides processes that generate disaster-related (or goal-related) feedback at 
the cost of only a small fraction of disaster avoidance (or goal achievement) 
resources. 
Such a domain gives a robot multiple opportunities to avoid disaster, and rewards 
attempts with helpful information. Moreover, this combination allows application of the 
Marginal Utility heuristic [ 16, pp. 137,148]: it is optimal to perform the action that 
delivers the highest goal-achieving likelihood per unit cost of goal-achieving resources. 
If it is not known which action is most likely to successfully avoid disaster, then the 
action of choice is the one that delivers the most valuable information as cheaply as 
possible. It is still possible that disasters will happen anyway, but only if the robot had 
little chance from the outset. 
Fortuitously, the design of EVAR’s hardware and software satisfies the Rapid Feedback 
Principle for the astronaut retrieval task. Long-range target recognition is early feedback, 
and motions can consume arbitrarily small amounts of rescue time and fuel. From there, 
the Marginal Utility heuristic says that EVAR should investigate the nearest and most 
astronaut-like objects first. 
Notice that the rapid feedback principle is satisfied by vertebrates for the task of 
survival (by virtue of long-range sensors and high maneuverability) ; that humans achieve 
both survival and efficient behavior by modifying their physical environment to make the 
principle true (e.g. with early feedback consisting of signs, obstacles, or error messages) ;
that robots of anthropomorphic design, and robots in human habitats, may well satisfy 
the principle accidentally, for many physical tasks; and that in general, a robot may be 
engineered to satisfy the principle for specific tasks through suitable choices of sensors 
and effecters. 
6.6. Redejning the quali$cation problem 
We now turn to consider some aspects of our modal logic formalization. In particular, 
our practice of describing actions as having effects in all post-action open-loop futures 
requires explanation, since the range of open-loop futures might include meteorites, 
earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. 
In early work, the practice of proving plans correct was insufficiently distinguished 
from the practice of proving disembodied programs correct, and the descriptions of 
actions were taken literally (promised effects were guaranteed to result from action 
performance, preconditions were supposed to be necessary and sufficient for action 
success, and plans could be proved to work). These assumptions lead to one form of 
the qualification problem in which preconditions should be not only necessary 4 for 
4 Necessary = the action will work only $ P, so that preconditions may be missing, the set of satisfying 
situations may be a superset of the set in which the action works, and the action may be tried when in fact it 
could not work. 
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action success but also sufficient.” For example, the frequent observation that starting 
my car works whenever there is no potato in the tailpipe, and the battery is not flat, 
and... is motivated by the desire that preconditions should be sufficient to guarantee 
successful performance, hence necessary and sufficient. 
Instead of this philosophy we came to the position that 
preconditions should be necessary and sufficient to guarantee achievement of the 
postconditions under an assumption of disturbance-free controllable behavior; 
and suficient to enable likely achievement of the postconditions across the range 
of situations that satisfy the preconditions. 
We now discuss this idea in some detail, starting at its end. 
By saying that preconditions should be sufficient to enable likely success we are 
allowing both that the preconditions may not be “necessary”, and that they may not be 
sufficient to guarantee every-time success. If an action’s preconditions are “not neces- 
sary” 6 the action may occasionally not be tried when it could work, but that does not 
matter if there are alternative actions; and if there was some circumstance in which it did 
matter, that circumstance could be detected automatically as a conditionally unachiev- 
able goal, e.g. during plan synthesis or domain mode1 checking. (The U.P.‘s synthesis 
algorithms perform precisely the required analysis [ 531.) If an action’s preconditions 
are not sufficient to guarantee every-time success, we can compensate by trying the 
action again, or by trying a different action [22]. Thus, it turns out that for many 
problems-including starting a car-there is no need for a guarantee that any particular 
attempt will be successful. Indeed, many actions, despite their frequent reliability, are 
better seen as experiments. Perhaps the car will start this time, perhaps it won’t; perhaps 
the car will start eventually, perhaps not. Humans, and our robot control plan similarly, 
make up for the lack of absolute guarantees by simply making an attempt and perceiving 
the results. 
[ Aside: If po is the probability that a desired result holds before the first attempt to 
achieve it, and if an action attempt succeeds with probability p > 0, then the probability 
that at least n (n 3 1) attempts will be required is ( I- po) ( 1 -p) P’, and the expected 
number of attempts to achieve success is ( 1 - po)/p. ] 
If actions have sufficient preconditions for likely success, it is possible that, in some 
strange circumstance, all the actions described as being likely to achieve a desired 
condition are in fact useless. Then there remains the option of trying alternative solutions 
to supergoals: after a few failed attempts to start one car, both we and a robotic system 
can start a different car, or catch a bus, or work at home, or take a vacation day. This line 
of argument finally breaks down only when every goal in the entire chain of supergoals 
of our present activity-including the goal that is the final purpose of the whole plan, 
e.g. having enough to eat-is not achievable in the present circumstance. If enough 
energy is spent on providing the robotic system with alternative courses of action, that 
5 Sufficient = the action will work whenever P, so that superfluous preconditions may be present, the set of 
satisfying situations may be a subset of the set in which the action works, and the action may be ruled out 
when in fact it would work. 
6 Not necessary = the set of satisfying situations does not contain all situations in which the action works. 
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possibility can be made arbitrarily remote, and having sufficient preconditions on likely 
action success is good enough. 
Thus, in our opinion the primary reason to desire sufficient preconditions on guar- 
anteed action success is not to ensure plan robustness, which can be achieved by other 
means, but to achieve ideally efficient robotic behavior (avoiding futile attempts)- 
which in fact is rather inefficient because it requires checking a much longer list of 
preconditions that are very likely to be already true (no potato in tailpipe just now). 
It is debatable whether a given amount of domain engineering effort is better spent 
on increasing the likelihood of multi-try goal achievement or the likelihood of first-try 
action success. 
Next we come to the modal formalism’s assumption of disturbance-free controllability. 
Bearing in mind that a disturbance is technically defined as something that affects the 
behavior of a closed-loop system from outside the control loop, it is easy to see that 
to a first approximation the qualification problem is about disturbances. Earthquakes, 
meteorites, potatoes in tailpipes and flat batteries are not “in the driving loop”, and 
they are not phenomena one can prevent. One can deal with them in two ways, by 
compensating for their occurrence, or by changing both the definition of the controlled 
system and the design of the controller so that the disturbances become controllable. 
Often, the latter is not feasible. 
Controllability is a technical term as well. A system is controllable if it is possible to 
drive the system to a particular desired state no matter what the system’s initial state is, 
The synthesis of U.P.s amounts to a constructive controllability analysis, in this narrow 
sense of the word. A wider use of the term is to imply that all the important process 
variables can be changed conveniently and that appropriate f edback can be obtained. In 
either sense, the assumption of controllability rules out most system malfunctions and 
breaks in the control loop. 
Our control plan occasionally issued commands that seemed to vanish into hyper- 
space, perhaps due to bugs in the communications software. Such breakages make a 
system temporarily open-loop and eventually uncontrollable. By allowing action de- 
scriptions to assume the absence of such events we licensed stronger postconditions and 
weaker sufficient preconditions than would otherwise be valid. Thus, we represented 
most of our plan’s actions as being guaranteed to work in all possible (disturbance-free 
controllable) futures, despite the fact that the system was intermittently uncontrol- 
lable. 
It might be felt that our use of control-theoretic terms has merely legitimized ignor- 
ing the qualification problem, but in fact there are qualification problems that are not 
attributable to either disturbances or uncontrollability. The examples of blocks attached 
to each other with bars, and of pulley systems that cause blocks to move when the 
robot reaches for them, do not qualify as disturbances because their effects are due to 
the robot’s own actions-they are in-the-loop. In the control systems community such 
effects are called “unmodelled ynamics”. As that name implies, they arise from an 
incorrect or incomplete model of the system to be controlled. It is precisely this as- 
pect of the qualification problem that has yielded to work on automated explication of 
previously implicit model structure, e.g. [ 301. 
It follows that our definitions have split the qualification problem in a useful way. 
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Using the notions of disturbances and (lack of) controllability we have drawn a boundary 
around one set of things that cause problems. Our boundary is defined by the design of a 
complete closed-loop system, which inherently determines both what is controllable and 
what is a disturbance. It accepts as fact that some things are inherently uncontrollable. 
The qualification problem, however, is generally thought of as a problem of inadequate 
domain modelling, but defining it that way makes automated discovery the only solution 
and further makes the problem unsolvable. The qualification problem could usefully 
be redefined to include only unmodelled dynamics, leaving disturbances as a separate 
problem to be tackled with robust compensation at plan execution time. 
The acknowledged invalidity of the assumptions underlying our modal formalization- 
adopted only for action representation purposes-results in an inability to give hard 
guarantees that an action will definitely have a represented effect, but that’s why precon- 
ditions should also be sufficient to enable likely action success in general. The upshot is 
that when our action descriptions posit, using next and soon modalities, an outcome in 
“all possible” (post-action) open-loop futures as opposed to “some possible” open-loop 
futures, the assertion being made is that the action can confidently be expected-without 
absolute guarantees-to work after a single attempt. Two examples from opposite sides 
of this distinction are the action of moving the robot’s arm to a desired position, which 
can be expected to work (under suitable assumptions), and the action of looking in a 
random place for a lost object, which cannot. This distinction was to be used by our 
plan execution machinery to limit the system’s patience: actions that were expected to 
work were to be tried only a few times, actions that were not expected to work could 
be tried more often and as less desirable options; but we have not implemented this 
yet. 
Said differently, our action descriptions (operator types) encoded the heuristic knowl- 
edge that, if any of an action’s purported effects were desired, then (under suitable 
preconditions) the action was a good one to tty. Rephrasing the position stated at the 
beginning of this section, we conjecture that preconditions should describe, not the con- 
ditions on action success, but the conditions under which an action can be attempted 
and frequently succeed. Having a tailpipe free of obstruction is not a precondition on 
attempting to start a car. (However, if the car subsequently fails to start, a blocked 
tailpipe may become relevant as an explanation.) 
For similar reasons, planning does not prove that a plan will work. Planning is no 
more (and no less!) than the automatic synthesis of a proof to the effect that, given 
a goal and an assumption of controllability in the broad sense, the modelled system 
is in fact controllable in the narrow sense, and as a bonus the planner constructs an 
appropriate trajectory or control law (a plan). Action-ordering planners yield only the 
part of the control law that is required for a narrow range of expected trajectories through 
the state space. A U.P. is a complete control law. 
6.7. Acting on beliefs 
The title of this section is deliberately ambiguous, referring to three related facts: 
( I ) Our controller operates continuously on large amounts of faith in Newtonian 
dynamics, as mentioned in Section 6.3; 
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(2) The plan’s beliefs about current world state are themselves a dynamical subsystem 
with degerative open-loop behavior, and that dynamic must be replaced with a 
closed-loop dynamic, as described in Section 5.5; 
(3) There are three mechanisms by which beliefs might become false: 
(a) open-loop dynamics, which can be modelled and so allow the plan to predict 
when its current state-estimate beliefs will become false; 
(b) disturbances, which cannot all be predicted and so force the state estimation 
subsystem to weaken all its beliefs uniformly with the passage of time; and 
(c) newly initiated processes, which require the plan to act directly on the state 
estimation subsystem (even before the processes have any noticeable ef- 
fects) so as to cancel that subsystem’s faith that its predictions are still 
plausible. The exact cancellations required can be deduced from the de- 
scriptions of the actions taken. 
As an example of point 3(c), performance of the clamp-opening action had to invali- 
date the belief that b next/soon sust kw clamp_closed. Since the clamp will not open by 
itself there is no reason, besides the effects of the plan’s own actions, to request updates 
on the clamp’s state. Making the plan invalidate the relevant state estimate caused the 
plan (in the next sense-act cycle) to immediately request a robot status update. In the 
absence of such an update the plan would have gone on “knowing” that the clamp was 
closed even after the plan had opened it. 
Some of the effects of actions upon beliefs can be expressed and inferred under our 
modal logic formalization. The effect of clamp-opening is b next b clamp-open from 
which we can deduce b nexhk clamp-closed. Assuming that k clamp-closed was true 
before the action (so that there was indeed some “knowledge” to be undermined) we 
see that clamp-opening immediately undermines the knowledge we had. Moreover, we 
also have the domain axioms 
b clamp-open > cant b clamp-open 
b clamp-closed > cant b clamp-closed 
-a pleasing variety of “frame” or “inertia” axioms not requiring mention of any 
actions-which allow us to deduce 
b next b clamp-open 1 b next cant-k clamp-closed 
k clamp-closed > b next cont~k-&mp_closed. 
Putting the consequents together we obtain b next conhkw clamp-closed, from which 
it follows that -b soon sust kw clamp_closed and lb next sust kw clamp-closed, thus 
demanding immediate sensing to sustain knowledge even though present knowledge may 
be valid. 
If the effect of clamp-opening were b soon b clamp_open the deduction would not 
work. The domain axioms allow us to deduce 
b soon b clamp-open > b soon conhk clamp-closed 
k clamp-closed > b soon cont~k~clampclosed. 
220 M. SchopperdArtificial Intelligence 73 (1995) 175-230 
Conjoining the consequents we get b soon contlkw clamp-closed, but from there to 
-b soon sust kw clamp-closed fails because b soon cant-kw clamp-closed and b soon 
sust kw clamp-closed are consistent: an eventual problem may allow prior corrective 
action (cf. Section 3.5). 
In sum, when an action has next effects, the representation of those effects can be used 
to automatically disable the believed sustainability of the knowledge that the action’s 
effects are false, provided that suitable domain axioms are present. 
6.8. Plan size 
This section discusses the size of the complete UP for controlling EVAR. The C 
code defined, and the U.P. made use of, 191 functions implementing true/false tests. 
[29] proved that a domain of that size would on average require a Boolean circuit of 
219’/(4 x 191) = lO55 gates, and then interpreted that as a result about the expected 
size of U.P.s. This result continues to be frequently cited as an argument against the 
feasibility of U.P.s. 
In our code, subplans were implemented as C functions which invoked other subplans 
to achieve preconditions (if necessary), and which performed an action only if all 
preconditions were true. Each subplan was defined only once in the C code, although 
of course subplan functions could be invoked any number of times-just as a symbolic 
goal reduction rule needs to be defined only once but can be used to achieve any number 
of goal instances. Thus it was nontrivial to find out how big the UP would have been if 
all invocations of subplan functions were replaced with textual subplan copies. This size 
was determined as follows. We started with the primitive subplans (no preconditions), 
assigning them a weight of 1, and then proceeded upwards from invoked subplan to 
invoking subplan, adding the subplan weights. The number of leaf nodes produced by 
the sust k P macro was calculated as 
2 x (#sustkw_P_leaves + 1) 
+ 2 x (#sust-b_P_leaves + 1) 
In this way we found that a textually explicit plan would have had 291,028 leaf nodes 
(condition-action rules). At its deepest the plan applied 26 Boolean tests to the world 
state estimate. 
This plan size measurement is nowhere near the predicted lO55 leaf nodes. The most 
obvious reason for the difference is that our UP executes subplans in parallel, allowing 
a “reaction” to be a combination of several actions taken independently by parallel 
subplans-a possibility Ginsberg did not consider. How large would our plan have been 
if all composite reactions had to be explicitly identified and selected? Equivalently, how 
many types of world states does our plan actually distinguish and react to? 
To calculate this size we again started with the primitive subplans, assigning them 
a weight of 1 and proceeding upwards as before, but noting whether subplans were 
invoked in parallel or in serial, and either multiplying or adding the subplan weights. 
Plan size below each sust k P macro was calculated as 
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(#susthv_Pleuves + 1) 
+ (#sust_kw_P_leave.s + 1) x 
2 x (#sustbP_leuves + 1) 
- 2 c #shared_subplanleaves2 
+ 2 1 #sharedsubplan_leaves. 
This formula takes into account that two identical subplans being executed in parallel 
can be replaced with one such subplan. We also took into account that in U.P.s, a 
protected achieved goal can eliminate the need for whole subplans. Thus we found 
that, if made textually explicit without parallelism, our UP would have had 1.3 x lOto 
leaf nodes (condition-action rules), associating each with an appropriate composite 
reaction. 
We are still 45 orders of magnitude short of the predicted 1O55 leaf nodes. To account 
for the difference we observe that Ginsberg’s circuit size argument tacitly assumed that 
the Boolean inputs would be independent. If there are N independent Boolean inputs, 
there are S = 2N combinations of inputs and 2’ different Boolean functions, most of 
which need S/(4 log, S) gates to implement them. If the inputs are not independent, 
there will be S’ < S combinations of inputs and 2s’ < 2s different Boolean functions 
requiring only S’/( 4 log, S’) gates. For example, if our 191 Boolean variables were 
constrained with 360 binary clauses, the number of possible value assignments on those 
variables would, on average, decrease to S’ = S x (3/4) 360 x S x 1O-45 (cf. [ 231)) and 
the expected size of a Boolean circuit on those variables would shrink by approximately 
the same factor. 
In summary, in the astronaut retrieval domain defined by 191 true/false tests on world 
state, dependencies between tests (and perhaps some other unknown factors) reduce the 
expected size of our U.P. from 10s5 to 1.3 x 10 lo leaf nodes; parallel execution of 
subplans reduces that to 2.9 x lo5 leaf nodes; and lastly, replacing a fully assembled 
decision tree with dynamically assemblable subtrees reduces the plan to 47 subtrees. 
(The complete C code for our UJ? consisted of 1,900 lines of code, not counting 
comments, instrumentation, and lines of 1 character or less.) 
These dramatic plan size reductions are possible by virtue of specific features of the 
domain, namely: 
( 1) the utility of parallel execution of subplans indicates separately controllable sub- 
domains; and 
(2) the effectiveness of factoring a U.l? into subplans indicates “domain symmetry”, 
specifically the number of action types that share the same precondition type; 
and 
(3) indexical-functional variables are useful in proportion to the number of domain 
objects that may assume a given role relative to the robot. 
These points deserve some elaboration. First, in the EVAR domain there is lots of 
room for parallelism because goal achievement and goal monitoring sustainment never 
interfere. 
Second, U.P.s are uniquely well suited to achieve the same precondition in different 
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contexts. Since all subplans of a UP. are themselves reactive and universal, Universal 
subplans are context-independent. Hence for each precondition or goal type, only one 
subplan needs to be defined, and that subplan can be reused without change to achieve 
that goal type in any context. This multi-context relevance is especially noticeable for 
subplans that control sensors, since such subplans are involved in the achievement of 
all knowledge goals, and knowledge goals number half of the goals occurring in the 
plan. 
Third, our U.P. also exploits indexical-functional variables which are dynamically 
assigned to track physical objects. If only one astronaut is the-astronaut-l’m-rescuing- 
now, the existence of any number of other astronauts multiplies domain complexity 
without affecting plan size. 
Thus our plan size experience bears out the arguments of [ 121 and [ 551. 
Our UP, in defining I .3 x 10 ” different classes of world states and specifying 
an appropriate reaction for each such class, may be the most discriminating Boolean 
classifier ever produced in software. 
7. Loose ends 
This section presents questions and problems we encountered but did not solve to our 
satisfaction. 
7.1. Limits of lJ.l? capabilit? 
Now that we have augmented the original U.P. ability to compensate for disturbances 
with a new ability to exploit dynamics, what can the formalism not handle? 
A general answer is that U.P.s are Turing-equivalent: U.P.s can include actions that 
directly modify beliefs, and other actions that react to those beliefs. It follows that there 
is little that U.P.s cannot compute. In particular, there is nothing to prevent a UP. from 
including actions that keep count of their number of consecutive performances (both 
the C code and the UP. interpreter provide an execution cycle counter), so that when a 
patience limit is reached, a different action may be used to achieve the same goal, cf. 
Section 6.6. 
However, Turing-equivalent computing in isolation is a different problem than embed- 
ded control of dynamics, and the current UP synthesis algorithms leave some control 
problems unsolved. Observe that all the actions modelled in Section 3.5 require action 
on EVAR’s part. Encoding open-loop dynamics at the symbolic level may also be useful. 
Some cases are trivial. For example, suppose that a robot wanted to close a door which 
happened to be spring-loaded, so that the only needed action was to release the door. 
This could be encoded with an “open-loop pseudo-action” such as: 
open-loop -- 
b soon sust b door_closed(X) 
<+ b cant b spring-loaded(X) ? 
b sust b unobstructed(X). 
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where the openloop action is a no-op. (Our existing UP. interpreter can store and 
manipulate any number of effects under the same action name.) For a more problematic 
example, suppose that a U.I? wanted a robot to pick up an object that happened to be 
covered with grease. Also suppose that the domain model had no concept of grease, 
but could encode that in some situations, successfully grasped and raised objects would 
invariably slip out of the robot’s grasp under the influence of an open-loop dynamic 
(gravity). U.I? synthesis should then realize that it would be futile to perform any 
lifting that set up a situation enabling the grasp-defeating open-loop dynamic. The 
present U.I? synthesis machinery will not notice the futility of such actions because 
it ignores (open-loop) processes that are not accomplishing a task-related goal. We 
are currently working on a fusion of UPS with CIRCA [44], which considers both 
wanted and unwanted processes along with any timing constraints (see also Section 
7.4). 
7.2. Unterminated processes 
Recall that our UP performs “actions” to initiate potentially lengthy processes in 
the robot or its environment. We found that some disturbances could shift the plan’s 
focus of attention so radically that previously needed processes became irrelevant and 
were therefore ignored, while the process itself continued as previously requested and 
sometimes produced behavior that was strange but not wrong. As an example that did 
not actually occur but that makes the point very graphically, a disturbance occurring in 
the middle of a robotic arm motion, if it rendered the existing motion irrelevant without 
requiring the arm for a new purpose, could leave the arm in an out-stretched position 
while the robot went about its new business unawares. 
This was one of the motivations for our explicitly marked “HACK" code. The problem 
could be fixed by inserting, at judicious points in the C code, a goal to terminate the stray 
process, e.g. by moving the arm to a more “natural” or “relaxed” position. However, 
such “stand-down” subgoals often could not be interpreted as preconditions on any 
action. 
A solution to this problem must meet the constraint that in any control system, no 
subsystem may ever be left unsupervised. It is not a solution to design the coordination 
level so that all its “actions” on subsystems consist of small procedures. While this 
would ensure that subsystems eventually reached a stand-down posture, it would also 
interfere with proper reactive behavior and could still look silly, leaving a procedure to 
run to completion when the entire procedure was no longer relevant. A slightly better 
solution is to have “actions” consist of only two steps, one for the desired effect and 
one for a stand-down, with the stand-down to be performed only if the coordinator 
forgets to say otherwise. This approach would need to decide under what conditions 
the stand-down should be performed, i.e. at what point can a process consider itself 
to have become “stray”. The same question arises if the stand-down behavior is built 
into a subsystem as a default or emergency response. The ideal solution would be for 
the coordination level to monitor its own focus of attention, issuing subsystem-specific 
stand-down commands as soon as a subsystem’s services were no longer needed for any 
current goal. 
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7.3. Inadequate representation of quantitative information 
Our current formalism has obvious limitations in that it does not support the explicit 
representation of quantitative information about either certainty or time. Thus it is not 
possible to automatically make use of two sensors simultaneously when that would 
deliver higher certainty than either sensor used alone. Similarly, there is a built-in 
assumption that perceived information is always more reliable than information obtained 
by model-based estimation. On the topic of quantitative time, it is not possible to 
symbolically represent the amount of time it usually takes to complete an action. 
Fortunately, these limitations turned out to be nearly irrelevant to the EVAR domain. 
The inability to use two sensors never became an issue because no two sensors delivered 
readings of the same quantity; the assumption that perceived information is more reliable 
than projected information turned out to be true because projections were based on 
earlier readings whose certainty was no higher than that of new readings; and a lot of 
quantitative temporal information could be built into the C code that evaluated the plan’s 
conditions. An example of the latter is that it was possible to evaluate the condition b 
soon P as true for 1 second after attempting to achieve P, and thereafter to evaluate it 
as true if observed movements were appropriate. 
Indeed, the formalism exhibited only one serious problem deriving from the repre- 
sentatioual lack of quantitative timing. The plan sometimes wanted to carefully measure 
distance to the Space Station (to avoid a collision) while also watching the retrieved 
astronaut (to make sure we still had her), but could not watch them both at once. The 
resulting behavior was that the robot looked at the Space Station, got the knowledge 
it wanted, believed that knowledge to be good for some indefinite time and so turned 
to look at the astronaut, then lost confidence in the Space Station’s position before the 
astronaut had actually been seen, and so looked back at the Space Station, losing track 
of the astronaut entirely. This problem was solved with a hand-coded hack because the 
formalism did not represent enough information to support automated detection of the 
problem. On the other hand it is also not clear that a more explicit formalism is the only 
answer: a dynamic resource scheduler/arbitrator such as that of [6] might do as well. 
Another timing problem could have arisen when an object moved to exit the laser 
scanner’s field of view at its bottom edge. Until the scanner’s elevation (or tilt) became 
zero the object could be tracked by moving only the laser scanner. After that, keeping 
the object in view required rotation of the robot’s entire body, and furthermore, the 
time at which this “downward” rotation should be initiated depended on the object’s 
trajectory and on the robot’s inertia (see Fig. 7). Our plan was able to rotate the body 
as necessary to catch up with the target object, but we did not try to get the timing 
right, largely because this problem either never arose or was accidentally solved, so we 
did not realize its possible existence until well after the project was over. This particular 
example might have been properly solvable with suitable re-working of the b next 
sust b laserable condition, but we can imagine that some subsystem interactions 
might require even more foresight-what if something else had to be done before the 
body could be rotated-and at some point it becomes undesirable for the b next sust 
b laserable predicate to have to consider the entire robot’s kinematics and dynamics 
when deciding if it is time to begin rotating the body. 
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I- laser motionAbody motion- 
time target not visible 
Fig. 7. Tracking can require well-timed body rotation. 
7.4. Coincidental real-time peformance 
UP execution is currently only “coincidentally real-time”: it can cycle at least an order 
of magnitude faster than the dynamics of the EVAR domain, but there are currently no 
hard real-time guarantees. 
Nevertheless, it will be important in future work that the UP is not directly involved 
in controlling sensors or effecters, it only tells the robot’s servo loops how the sensors 
and effecters should be controlled. The main reason for this division of labor is that 
the time constraints on servo loops are much more severe than those on changing loop 
parameters. 
We are already working to provide hard real-time guarantees on UP execution. We 
expect to use an adaptation of the CIRCA approach [ 441. 
8. Concluding remarks 
We have presented extensions of the Univeral Plans representation that: provide for 
dependencies of sensing on action and vice versa; allow monitoring of the progress 
and outcomes of processes; enable exploitation and/or forestalling of the consequences 
of domain dynamics; and protect the original provisions for robust plan execution and 
automated plan synthesis. We have also discussed the control-theoretic underpinnings 
of U.P.s, including: the relation between the qualification problem and our assumptions 
about the nature of action primitives; our view that perception-based state estimates 
comprise a subsystem with a degenerative open-loop dynamic; the fact that actions 
must have effects on beliefs even before they have effects on the physical world; and 
the danger of ignoring any sequence of perceived states, no matter how unlikely. See 
especially Sections 6 and 7. 
A complex and highly parallel UP for EVA Retriever control, built using the for- 
malisms described herein, has been thoroughly tested by randomly chosen NASA offi- 
cials against a NASA-built simulation of the EVA Retriever robot undergoing realistic 
dynamics and worst-case disturbance scenarios. The plan exploits known helpful dy- 
namics for economy of effort; neutralizes known counter-productive dynamics (but see 
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Section 7.1); recovers robustly from disturbances, including intermittent bugs in the 
control system being supervised; also recovers robustly from mistaken perceptions; and 
runs very efficiently. 
A summary insight to be gained from this paper is that there is no inherent conflict 
between highly reactive and flexible behavior on one hand, and guarantees about system 
behavior on the other. The “unpredictability” of reactive systems is worrisome only 
if “predictability” requires tracing out a sequence of (partial) world and/or machine 
states, as is done by traditional planning systems, finite state machines, instruction 
address registers, and so forth-all of which embody the computer science notion of 
predictability rather than the control theoretic notion. To see why the computer science 
notion of predictability is counter-productive in a controls setting we need only recall 
the limitations of feedforward controllers (cf. Section 3.2): they are brittle because 
they are at once unable to compensate for the inevitable disturbances, and extremely 
dependent on the correctness of their assumptions about the system being controlled. 
This weakness has long been known for continuous-variable control systems, and has 
now been reproduced in AI planning systems. In both cases the relevant fields have 
discovered and embraced feedback and after-the-fact compensation for disturbances. 
The U.I? representation takes the analogy between the fields a step further by taking 
dynamics seriously, and by enabling controllability analyses of control laws (a.k.a. 
plans) over entire state spaces rather than over a few trajectories (see Sections 2.1 and 
2.2). There is yet more progress to be made in the direction of theoretical knowledge 
about what stability is and how to achieve it, how to trade off responsiveness against 
stability, and how to control with limited observability, see e.g. [ 10,361. Inability to 
predict trajectories merely forces us into a more control-theoretic approach wherein 
feedback controllers are much more robust and no less amenable to guarantees. 
The foundation of this paper is the nature of dynamics as patterns of events. Newtonian 
orbital dynamics represent an extreme of reliability but are by no means the only useful 
dynamics, nor is physical law the only useful kind of causality. Indeed, the ability of 
humans (and animals) to utilize dynamics far outstrips our ability to theorize about the 
dynamics being exploited, as the following examples show. 
l Steam engines with flyball governors were in use long before there were theories 
for thermodynamics and control. 
l Some people make provocative statements as a way of testing a hearer’s beliefs, 
then assume that lack of argument implies agreement. Knowing about this dynamic 
is helpful both to avoid silly discussions and to prevent otherwise inexplicable 
rumors. Conversations are dominated by informal dynamics of this sort. 
l The book Games People Play [5] is a long list of the vicious circles and self- 
destructive behaviors that routinely result from human emotional dynamics (for 
which there is no underlying theory). Many of the “games” can be terminated by 
refusing to behave habitually. 
l Until human babies learn that parents continue to exist even when out of sight, a 
parent’s departure is deeply frightening and causes the baby to scream, which in 
turn causes the parents to exist again. 
These examples put inaccurate domain models into a broad perspective which makes 
approximations and heuristics the norm. As mentioned in Section 3.2, control systems 
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engineers are inevitably stuck with a certain amount of abstraction and ignorance, such 
that even thoroughly flight-tested aircraft can crash due to previously undiscovered 
dynamics (air is not an ideal gas, aircraft surfaces may bend and even vibrate, etc). 
In particle physics-the technical field most renowned for penetrating many layers of 
abstraction-quark theory is now widely believed to be an approximation. In many areas 
of human activity, such as social interactions, there are currently no predictively useful 
theories at all. But dynamics do not need to be based on deep theories: conversational 
dynamics are important information nevertheless. Nor do dynamics models need to be 
precisely correct to be useful: misguided or not, a baby’s screaming generally does bring 
the parents back. 
The above examples also point to the implicit faith all people have in dynamics, since 
reliance on abstractions requires faith. Recall that even the Newtonian gravitation law 
is an abstraction: no-one knows what gravity is. Hence the orbital dynamics arising 
from Newton’s theory can be exploited only with some measure of faith. From babies 
accepting the constant existence of their parents, to astronauts shooting for the moon, 
the human race is adrift on an ocean of faith, separated from brute reality through lack 
of time and the limitations of human intelligence. Philosophers know the magnitude 
of the faith, examine it even to questioning their own existence, and despair at the 
chasm between themselves and true knowledge. Seen in such philosophic light, all our 
knowledge becomes mere belief, and all our action becomes mere attempt (cf. Section 
6.6). It becomes unsurprising that even our most sophisticated artifacts occasionally 
malfunction in unexpected ways. Nevertheless, on the whole, the human race has learned 
to manipulate many aspects of reality very effectively indeed. That this success finally 
rests on faith in dynamics is a clue to the importance of that faith. 
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